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Abstract
Short flows are highly valuable in the modern Internet and are widely used by applica-
tions in the form of web requests or with user interactions. These kinds of applications
are extremely sensitive to latency. A small additional delay, like one or two round trip
times (RTTs), may easily cause user frustration and lose usability of services. In the
most desirable scenario, we want to finish these kinds of flows in one network RTT.
Furthermore, we would like the network’s RTT to be as close as possible to the speed
of light. Unfortunately, in the current Internet, there are many unnecessary delays
caused by different kinds of policies– in particular, transmission protocol and routing
policies–driving us far away from this goal.
This thesis aims at answering the following two questions:
How can we optimize the transmission protocol to reduce short flows’ latency as close
as possible to one RTT and why are network RTTs still significantly larger than the
speed-of-light latency?
To reduce the transmission latency, we focused on the two main components of
short flows, connection establishment and data transmission. ASAP, a new naming and
transport protocol, is introduced to reduce the time spent on initial TCP connections. It
merges functionality of DNS and TCP’s connection establishment functions by piggy-
backing the connection establishment procedure atop the DNS lookup process. With
the help of ASAP, the host is able to save up to two-thirds of the time spent on initial
connection without exposing significant DoS vulnerabilities.
For data transmission, we designed a new control rate mechanism, Halfback, which
achieves low latency with limited bandwidth overhead and only requires sender-side
changes. Halfback has an aggressive startup phase, finishing transmission for most
short flows in one RTT, together with a Reverse-Ordering Proactively Retransmission
phase which helps the host to recovery quickly from packet loss caused by the aggres-
sive startup phase. Halfback is able to achieve 56% smaller flow completion time on
average and three times smaller in the 99th percentile.
RTT between two hosts is able to be more than 6 times the speed-of-light latency
for Directed Optical Fiber. To understand the composition of RTT inflation, we break
down the path inflation on the end-to-end path into its contribution factors. Based on
our result, 7.2% is caused by network topology, 18.8% is contributed by inter-domain
routing policies, 54.9% is caused by peering policies, and 25.6% is caused by intra-
domain routing policies. This result shows that the main component of the path infla-
ii
tion is caused by peering policies which may require more attention for future research.
Besides this, we also analyze the changes of the inflation caused by each contributing
factor across five years. According to our analysis, the total inflation has been reduced
by around 6% each year since 2010.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Research Problems
Short flows are highly valuable in the modern Internet. They drive many important
interactive networked applications, with web browsing the most prominent example.
In the current Internet, around 99% of flows carry traffic less than 100 KB [88]. For
this kind of flow, the user-perceived latency is a key challenge since even a relatively
small delay is able to cause user frustration, loss of usability of services, and reduction
of the number of customers and revenue [46, 83, 94, 78]. A recent study by Google
[38] shows that an additional delay as small as 100 milliseconds measurably reduced
users frequency of conducting searches; the effect increased over time, to a 0.74% drop
after 4-6 weeks of a 400 ms delay, and persisted for weeks after the artificial delay was
eliminated. Besides this, the revenue per person in Bing was reduced by 1.2% with a
500-millisecond delay and 4.3% with a two-second delay [100].
1.1.1 Connection Establishment
The main components of short flows are connection establishment and data transmis-
sion. Compared with long flows, connection establishment time is more important for
short flows since the total number of Round Trip Times (RTTs) used by short flows are
small. For example, downloading 11.18 KB (the median size of content located on a
single host [12]) from a server at the United States average connection speed, 4.6 Mbps
[23], ideally needs 30.1 millisecond for data transmission. However, before this, in cur-
rent protocols, the client first needs to perform a Domain Name System (DNS) lookup,
and execute TCP’s three-way handshake (3WH). This whole process may cause one to
two additional RTTs. Since RTTs are commonly on the order of 50-100 millisecond
[?] and the client may need to initiate multiple TCP sessions in serial to download the
page, the overhead for current connection establishment is able to account for a signif-
icant fraction of the total delay. From our experiments, the median latency caused by
3WH was 72 millisecond, and by DNS was 101 millisecond for the 100 most popular
U.S. websites [1]
There are many projects proposed to reducing latency spend on connection estab-
lishment. DNS latency is able to be reduced with caching and a lot of work tried to
improve the performance. [87, 49] try to use cooperative caching and lookup to speed
up DNS in isolation. [45] uses procatively caching to alleviate DNS resolution delay.
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TCP Extensions for Transactions (T/TCP) [37, 73] first tries to reducing the connec-
tion establishment time by eliminating the TCP’s 3WH. But, due to its vulnerability
of Denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, it is not widely deployed. Most work separate this
problem as two research problems: reducing TCP’s connection establishment time and
speeding up DNS performance. However, combining them as one problem is able to
obtain additional gains.
1.1.2 Data Transmission
The second important component for short flows is data transmission. The Internet’s
current transmission protocol, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), tries to use band-
width conservatively to achieve safety for all flows. However, at the same time, it
sacrifices the latency of short flows due to its startup scheme and slow packets recov-
ery mechanism. TCPs slow-start needs multiple RTTs to detect its fair sending rate.
Many short flows even cannot leave this startup phase before finishing transmission.
The situation becomes even worse because TCP also needs at least one RTT to detect
and recover from packet loss. When there are not enough packets to generate duplicate
ACKs or when the retransmitted packets are lost, the sender times out, waiting typi-
cally one or more RTTs. As a result, the completion time of a 32 KB flow from major
web sites to well-connected (PlanetLab) clients on the Internet is around 8.7 RTT [99]
which is far away from ideal. Finally, the above problems are magnified by bufferbloat
in which large router buffers lengthen RTT.
Many mechanisms have been proposed to optimize short flow transmission time.
Some require protocol changes and in-network router support, such as RCP [39],
RC3 [79] and QuickStart [96], and therefore have not seen any significant deploy-
ment. Others, such as Proactive TCP [53], increasing the initial congestion window to
10 [48, 25] and JumpStart [75] focus on sender-only changes. It is challenging to de-
sign a sender-only mechanism for reducing latency because a sender has very limited
information about the network at the beginning of a flow, and has to effectively guess
the best way (i.e. starting rate and retransmission policy) to transmit data quickly. All
the aforementioned sender-side optimizations choose to send more aggressively at the
initial start-up phase to reduce flow completion time (FCT). However, sending aggres-
sively will inevitably impact performance of other flows and indeed, all flows—even
the aggressive ones may suffer if short flows dominate the utilization of the network.
We refer to these as safety concerns. The key problem is to walk the delicate latency-
safety tradeoff space and find the sweet spot.
1.1.3 Path Inflation
Previously we focused on the total number of RTTs used by short flows, but besides
this, the latency of RTT is also important for short flows. The Direct Optical Fiber
(DOF) latency between New York City (in the northeast of the U.S.) and San Francisco
(in the southwest of the U.S.) should be around 20 millisecond; however, the RTTs
in the U.S. are commonly on the order of 50-100 millisecond, which is far from the
2
DOF latency. Many factors are able to cause this kind of path inflation. For example,
regarding a route from Gatineau, Canada, to a small city near Akola, India, since there
is no DOF connecting Canada and India it needs to travel to New York City first, then
go to Schweiz in Europe, and finally jump to India. This kind of detour will increase
a small amount of latency compared with DOF latency. In addition, routing protocols,
traffic engineering, and ISP policies are also able to increase the latency between two
hosts.
This kind of latency/path inflation has been seen for more than ten years. In the
past decade, a lot of researchers tried to figure out the contributors and the extent they
contribute to this inflation. Most of these works can be separated into two categories:
router-level and AS-level. Most router-level analyses [76, 106] were proposed more
than ten years ago. For example, [101] published in 2003 quantifies the causes of
path inflation into three levels and two categories and creates its own model for intra-
domain routing protocol. Other router-level analyses only focus on a small network,
such as [77] that only analyzes the inflation in the Spanish academic network. AS-
level projects [43, 57, 81] only analyze path inflation based on the AS-level topology
of the network. Some of the work [43, 107] directly uses the real routing information
collected from the Internet. The others use the valley-free and prefer-customer policies
as BGP routing policy. Since compared with router-level analyzing, they ignore a lot
of topological information for the network, they miss some contributors of the path
inflation.
1.2 Research Statements and Approaches
This paper studies the following questions:
• How can a transport protocol be designed to perform transactions of short flows
with latency as close as possible to a single RTT?
• How are we far away from speed-of-light latency? What are the components of
the path inflation in latency for one round trip time?
With the answers of these two questions, we are able to save a certain amount of RTTs
for short flows’ establishment and transmission. In addition, we also have a better
understand about the path inflation and points out the future direction to achieve speed-
of-light Round Trip Time.
To achieve these, we separate these two questions into three parts, reducing connec-
tion establishment time, reducing data transmission time and analyzing the contributors
of path inflation.
1.2.1 Reducing Latency for Connection Establishment
While DNS latency can be reduced with caching or employing a distributed set of
DNS servers reachable via anycast, in many cases [71] the lookup will have to visit an
authoritative DNS server that is relatively distant. In our project, we cut the latency
3
Figure 1.1: Overview of ASAP
by as much as one RTT by piggybacking the first transport packet within the DNS
query. The DNS server directly sends this packet to the server instead of sending DNS
response back to client and let client send the packet to server (Fig. 1.1) Although
related DNS shortcutting techniques have been proposed before [72], we show that it
can be done with modifications to only the client and the local DNS server, without
requiring changes in the global DNS infrastructure.
Besides this, we introduce a protocol which eliminates the need for TCP’s 3WH,
saving another RTT per connection. Since 3WH is an important part of TCP, it al-
lows the server to verify the provenance (source address) of a client’s request, to guard
against denial of service (DoS) attacks. To avoid having the same vulnerability as
T/TCP, our design ensures verifiable provenance while avoiding the need for a hand-
shaking step on every connection. A client obtains a certificate of provenance for its
current location, by handshaking with multiple provenance verifiers (PVs) to limit
eavesdropping attacks. The client includes this certificate with future transport con-
nection requests. The server can then locally verify the certificate and send a response
without waiting for a traditional handshake.
1.2.2 Reducing Latency for Data Transmission
To reduce the data transmission time used by short flows, we evaluate existing solutions
in terms of their latency performance and more importantly their latency-safety trade-
off. We evaluate both flow-level and application-level benchmarks. At the flow level,
we benchmark the latency with flow completion time (FCT) and benchmark safety
with two metrics: feasible network utilization, which is defined as the maximum
network utilization achievable before the throughput collapses, and TCP friendliness.
At the application level, we benchmark latency with web request response time and
benchmark safety with feasible network utilization with flow arrival process adhering
to the real application requests patterns.
We evaluated normal TCP and five existing solutions head-to-head: Proactive TCP,
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Figure 1.2: Tradeoff between common case latency (y axis) and feasible capacity in a pes-
simistic case of high workload from short flows (x axis).
Reactive TCP [53], increasing initial congestion window to 10 [48, 25] (referred to as
TCP-10 in this paper), PCP [28] and JumpStart [75] (Fig. 1.2). JumpStart and TCP-10
are closer to the trade-off frontier than the other two, but are still not good enough.
TCP-10 is still too conservative in many cases and renders both long FCT and slow
web response time even when the network load is low. JumpStart achieves better flow-
level latency performance by pacing out all the data at first RTT. However, after the
first batch of data gets paced out, it falls back to normal TCP with bursty and reactive-
only transmission. As we show in §4.3, the bursty retransmission makes JumpStart
too aggressive and thus renders unsatisfying safety benchmarks: it has low flow-level
feasible network utilization, which makes its application-level web response time un-
acceptable even under median network load, and impacts TCP friendliness. Moreover,
JumpStart also has suboptimal latency performance by only relying on reactive packet
loss detection.
Based on the evaluation of existing solutions, we propose a new short-flow trans-
mission optimization mechanism, Halfback, that improves both latency and safety at
both the flow level and the application level. Halfback borrows the initial starting
phase from JumpStart: pacing out packets within one RTT for short flow. However,
Halfback rises where JumpStart fails with a novel Reverse-Ordered Proactive Retrans-
mission (ROPR) mechanism to improve reactiveness to packet loss and improve safety
by limiting aggressiveness at retransmission. ROPR proactively retransmits packets in
reverse order (starting at the end of the short flow) at the rate of receiving ACKs.
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1.2.3 Quantifying Path Inflation in Router-level
In this work we want to analyze the path inflation in two directions. The first direc-
tion is the same as in previous works: we want to figure out the extent to which each
factor inflates the latency. To achieve this, we separate the contributors into two cat-
egories, network topology and routing policies. For the routing policies, we further
separate them into three parts: the policies used to select the path within an ISP (intra-
domain routing policies), those used to select the peering links to reach neighboring
ISPs (peering policies), and those used to select the path of sequence of ISPs to reach
the destination (inter-domain routing policies). This kind of result is able to help the
future researchers to gain insight when they design new networks, routing policies, or
ISP policies.
The other direction is how the path inflation changed across multiple years, espe-
cially for the inflation caused by different factors. Since path inflation was discovered,
a lot of researchers have paid attention to it and dozens of projects proposed to ana-
lyze [101, 76, 43, 57] or reduce [44, 29] this inflation. However, up to now, no one has
tried to measure how much improvement has been made and how much inflation has
been reduced in the past a few years. In this work, we quantify the inflation caused
by the same possible factors as noted above for five years. To make the results com-
parable, we use the same data resource for network topology, AS relationship, router
geolocation information , and route information for different years. Based on these re-
sults, we are able to figure out how the inflation has changed during the past five years
and how much improvement we have made.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
Our major contribution is designing two protocols, ASAP and Halfback, to achieve
flow completion time as close as possible to one RTT. In addition to this, by quanti-
fying the contributors of path inflation in router-level, we point out the future research
direction to reducing short flows’ latency further. Other contributions are as below:
• ASAP is the first transport protocol that can complete requests in a single RTT
without exposing significant DoS vulnerabilities. With the help of ASAP, the
connection establishment time is cut by up to two-thirds. Based on our evaluation
for DoS vulnerabilities, compared with TCP, when there are two provenance
verifiers used to prove the clients’ location, ASAP has 91.41% chance being
less vulnerable than TCP if the verifiers are randomly located. If we are able to
choose the location of the verifiers, in the worst case, there are less than 5% of
the client-server pairs may be attacked by the attacker.
• We evaluate Halfback with both flow-level and application-level benchmarks.
Based on the result of our evaluation, Halfback reduces latency by 13% (21%
in the 25% of cases where there is packet loss) compared to JumpStart and is
29%, 61%, 51% and 52% better than TCP-10, Proactive TCP, Reactive TCP
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and vanilla TCP. Further, we also evaluate Halfbacks FCT-vs.-safety tradeoff
compared with existing approaches. The results show that compared with Jump-
Start (the FCT winner among past proposals), Halfback achieves 19.25% lower
FCT, significantly improves the feasible network utilization by 1.4×, and also
improves TCP friendliness for both long and short TCP flows. Finally, we com-
pared the web response time by using Halfback and other proposals with real-
istic website data and request patterns. Because Halfback operates on a better
flow-level trade-off point, as shown in Fig. 1, it achieves significantly better
application-level latency-vs.- safety tradeoff with 592 millisecond (22%) page
load time reduction at 30% network utilization and significantly improves feasi-
ble network utilization by 1.57× comparing to JumpStart.
• We evaluate the contribution of four possible causes of path inflation–network
topology, intra-domain routing policies, peering policies, and inter-domain rout-
ing policies–in router-level based on the data set of December 2014. According
to our results, the main contributor of path inflation is peering policy, which in-
creases the inflation by 1.62×, in the median. For the other three causes, in
median, network topology increase the latency by 0.82%, intra-domain routing
policies increases it by 1.29×, and inter-domain increases it by 1.21×.
• Ours is the first work which evaluates the changes of path inflation over a period
of around five years. In the past few years, the inflation caused by network
topology has been reduced by 0.16% in the median from July 2010 to December
2014. This also helps to reduce the inflation caused by the other factors since one
more link may change the shortest path with different policies. To summarize,
in median, for the past five years, the inflation caused by inter-domain routing
policies, peering policies, and intra-domain routing policies has been reduced by
8.82%, 20.45%, and 5.88%, correspondingly.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we discuss
related works which tries to reduce short flows’ latency or quantify the path inflation in
the Internet. Chapter 3 introduces the new protocol ASAP used to save the time spend
on connection establishment. Chapter 4 shows how we reduce the transmission time
for short flows by Halfback. In Chapter 5, we analyze the causes of path inflation and
how it is changed across recent five years.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
2.1 Reducing Connection Establishment Time
Several previous work aim to bypass TCP’s 3WH to improve its performance for con-
nection establishment. However, without carefully designed, these protocols cannot
gain widespread popularity due to their vulnerability of malicious attacks, such as SYN
flood, amplified reflection attacks and so on. In this section, we introduce some pre-
vious work which try to reducing the connection establishment time by eliminating
TCP’s 3WH and their security mechanisms which used to avoid previous attacks.
TCP Extensions for Transactions (T/TCP) [37, 73] proposed in 1994 is the first
work which tries to bypass TCP’s connection handshake. Instead of mitigating the
security vulnerabilities caused by eliminating TCP’s 3WH, T/TCP mainly focuses on
combating old and duplicate SYNs. In T/TCP, each client-server pair has a monoton-
ically increasing variable, Connection Count (CC). This variable helps the server to
figure out the old or duplicate SYN requests. However, since CC value is monotoni-
cally increasing, it is easy for an attacker to fake a CC value which is able to pass the
test of the server. This leaves T/TCP open for all kinds of attacks we mentioned before,
as discussed in [62].
TCP Cookie Transactions (TCPCT) [98] is an extension of TCP proposed to se-
cure TCP connections. Unlike T/TCP which is designed to reduce latency, TCPCT is
primarily designed to eliminate server state during 3WH and avoid DoS attacks. The
TCPCT-enabled hosts use cookie exchange to negotiate elimination of server state.
Since the cookie pair is much too large to fit with the option space in TCP header,
TCPCT allows adding space in SYN packets for additional options while let hosts ex-
change limited amounts of data during the 3WH. In this case, the server sider client
needs to send the response in the SYN-ACK packet back to the client immediately af-
ter receiving data in the SYN packet. Otherwise, it can only send the response after
3WH finished. Besides this, TCPCT also constrains the size of server’s response to one
packet.
TCP Fast Open (TFO) [89] is a more recent alternative of T/TCP. The same as
TCPCT, TFO also uses cookies to eliminate server state and allows SYN and SYN-
ACK packets carry data. Unlike TCPCT which limits the size of the server’s response,
TFO allows the server to send data back during the handshake even after SYN-ACK
sent. TFO uses the same duplicated SYN handling mechanism as unmodified TCP
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which means that it allows the duplicate and old SYN with data. This makes TFO
simpler and more appealing to implement. However, it also leaves TFO open to SYN
flood attacks and the damage caused by this kind of attacks is much worse due to the
data carried in.
In addition to reducing connection establishing time from 3WH, there are also some
previous work try to reduce time from DNS resolution [87, 72]. Most of them are
designed to improve the caching performance, for example, [45] proactively cache
DNS records and [87, 90] use cooperative caching and lookup to speed up DNS in
isolation. Besides this, DEW [72] also explores ways by which a variety of Web
requests and responses could be piggybacked on DNS messages, similar as ASAP.
However, compared with ASAP which only requires modification for the LDNS and
leaving the global DNS infrastructure untouched, DEW needs to modify both LDNS
and ADNS which increases its difficulty of widely deployment.
2.2 Reducing Short Flows’ Transmission Time
In this section, we discuss work related to the challenges of reaching a high sending
rate quickly, dealing with loss, and bufferbloat.
2.2.1 Startup Phase
Many projects have been proposed to accelerate the startup phase of TCP. These can
be separated into five categories.
Aggressive startup: RC3 [79] uses a high initial sending rate and requires routers to
support priority queues to avoid negative effect. [48, 25] propose higher initial con-
gestion window size, and [75] proposes JumpStart, all of which we have evaluated
in
Sharing information between connections or hosts to make flows start at a more ap-
propriate rate: These mechanisms need complex cooperation [34] or even additional
bandwidth [36]. They also increase the difficulty of deployment by introducing a new
protocol.
Bandwidth estimation [41, 50] may not be accurate as end hosts lack real-time vis-
ibility into the network unless the routers explicitly mark available bandwidth in the
header [96] which increases the difficulty of deployment. We experimentally evaluated
one bandwidth estimation scheme [28].
Caching schemes [84] will draw back to Slow-Start when the variables are aged and
need careful tuning of their variables. We tested a caching scheme and even under
optimistic conditions, Halfback outperformed it in terms of latency, albeit with more
bandwidth overhead. While caching performs better than TCP, it still may not pick the
optimal window size, and does not improve packet loss response.
Faster connection setup mechanisms like TCP Fast Open [89] and ASAP [111] focus
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on reducing the time used in the three-way handshake of TCP connection establish-
ment. While connection setup time is a fairly large portion of short flows’ lifetime, the
handshake is orthogonal to Halfback’s optimization mechanism. Halfback focuses on
reducing the number of RTTs used for the actual data transfer of short flows and there-
fore, any of the connection establishment optimizations can be a drop-in replacement
for Halfback’s connection establishment process. All experiments in §4.3 include the
connection setup time without optimization.
2.2.2 Packet Loss Recovery
Short flows are sensitive to packet loss. The time spent by TCP for detecting packet
loss and retransmitting the lost packets is undesirable for short flows. [109, 66] reduce
packet loss at the last RTT of TCP’s slow-start by choosing an appropriate slow-start
threshold, ssthresh. As they are based on bandwidth estimation, the inaccuracy of
the bandwidth estimation causes inaccurate ssthresh estimation. Besides this, these
schemes offer no help to short flows that are too short to leave the slow-start phase,
which is a very common case.
Proactive retransmission [53] retransmits some packets before receiving the signal
of packet loss. These mechanisms try to save time used to detect packet loss and avoid a
timeout when the retransmitted packet is lost or the packet loss happens at the end of the
flow. However, the proactively retransmitted packets require extra bandwidth from the
network. This additional bandwidth reduces the scheme’s feasible capacity and may
cause problem to the co-exiting flows or the whole network. We have quantitatively
evaluated the proactive scheme of [53] in §4.3.
2.2.3 Bufferbloat
Bufferbloat [58, 42] happens when routers have large buffers that cause long queuing
delay, increasing the reaction time of packet loss and causing large latency for short
flows.
Many AQM algorithms [54, 52, 64] are used to solve this problem. These proto-
cols are more focused on the queue length than on the queuing delay and needed careful
variable tuning for different networks which avoids them being widely deployed. Later
AQM algorithms, most recently PIE [86] and CoDel [82], are directly focused on queu-
ing delay. However, the efficiency of the routers may be reduced since they requires
timestamps on every packets.
In additional to AQM algorithms, some protocols, such as DRS [51] and
DRWA [70], reduce the effect of Bufferbloat on the end host. In DRS [51], the receiver
automatically adjusts its buffer size to twice the estimated congestion window size of
the sender. Many operating systems use similar auto-tuning algorithms as DRS, like
Linux since kernel 2.4.27, Windows since Vista. As this kind of auto-tuning is unidi-
rectional, it can only mitigate the bufferbloat problem in some situations. DRWA [70],
used in cellular networks, adjusts the receiver’s buffer size bidirectionally to keep the
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queue size within a proper range. It is able to reduce the delay by 25% to 49% in
general cases and increase TCP throughput by up to 51%.
2.3 Causes of Path Inflations
Path inflation was first found around 15 years ago [101]. Since then, this phenomenon
has received a lot of attentions from researchers. Many projects analyze path inflation
and explain the causes of it. The works can be separated into two categories: router-
level [76, 106, 101, 77] and AS-level [81, 107, 43, 57].
[101] tries to quantify path inflation based on router-level map got from traceroute.
In their paper, they identify six possible causes of path inflation which are separated
into two categories: network topology and routing policy, at three layers: intra-domain,
inter-domain and peering. Besides this, the authors also create a new intra-domain
routing model according to the routing information collected. Based on their result,
intra-domain traffic engineering has minimal impact on path inflation and peering poli-
cies and inter-domain routing lead to significant inflation. Especially for inter-domain
routing, as BGP uses minimum AS-hop count to break the tie, around 50% of the paths
are longer than the shortest available path.
[106] also uses router-level network topology and tries to analyze the changing of
path inflation caused by the BGP protocol from April 2000 to May 2001. In their work,
the authors use early-exit peering policy together with valley-free and prefer-customer
policies to generate router-level policy path and compared the distance rate of this path
over the shortest router level path in 2000 with that in 2001. According to their result,
the inflation caused by this policy is nearly the same from 2000 to 2001.
Instead of considering all the nodes equally, [77] assigns a weight to each node
based the volume of traffic amount. The weighted path inflation is able to be used by
the network operators to decide where to reduce the path inflation, either the paths with
large path inflation or the paths which are important due to traffic volume. However,
since this weighted path inflation needs to collect traffic information for all the hosts,
it is very difficult to analyze it for large networks. In this paper, the authors only focus
on the Spanish academic network.
In addition to router-level path inflation, some research projects analyze AS-level
inflation. According to the routing information used, they are separated into two cat-
egories. The works[107, 43] in the first category directly use the routing information
collected from the Internet. For example, [107] uses Scriptroute to collect data from
363 PlanetLab nodes across 30 countries. Instead of using a snapshot of routes in the
Internet, this work collects the routing information from March 2007 to April 2007
and use it to figure out how the AS-level path inflation changed in a short time period.
Based on their results, the largest difference in AS path inflation on a particular con-
nection is able to be as high as 6, and the average is 2.5. Besides this, some nodes
experienced different paths over 70% of the experimental time.
For the second kind of projects [81, 57], instead of using the real routing infor-
mation, they create their own AS-level routing policy model. The most commonly
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used policies are valley-free and prefer-customer policies. In [81], the authors have
two scales analyzing, Internet-scale for AS-level and small-scale whose topology and
routes information are generated based on different variables, such as the routing pol-
icy used, the AS size, the number of peering links between ASs. For Internet-scale,
they just use valley-free and prefer-customer policies to simulate BGP routing. For
small-scale, this paper analyzed how the variables is able to affect the path inflation in
the network. This work demonstrates that when we design the future Internet, how we
are able to reduce the Path Inflation.
The router-level works, like [76, 106, 101], which analyze the large-scale networks
are conducted around ten years ago and may not accurately represent the current path
inflation situation in the current Internet due to the quick development of the Internet
in recent decades. Recent measurements of path inflation [77, 81, 107, 43, 57] either
only consider a small network [77] or mainly focus on AS-level networks. They cannot
help us to have an idea about the path inflation in the whole Internet including all the
routing policies and physical layer situations.
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Chapter 3
ASAP: Accelerated Secure
Association Protocol
3.1 Fast transport connection establishment
In this section, we present ASAP’s core transport connection establishment protocol,
which eliminates the 3WH while guarding against DoS attacks. We begin by revisiting
the motivation for the 3WH.
3.1.1 The Role of the Three-way Handshake
In TCP’s 3WH, the client sends the server a SYN packet containing an initial sequence
number (ISN); the server acknowledges this with a SYN-ACK including its own ISN;
and the client ACKs the server’s ISN. The client can then begin sending data (such as
an HTTP request). The 3WH thus adds one RTT of delay.1
There are two primary benefits of the 3WH. We discuss each, and how they fit into
ASAP’s design.
A. Idempotence
The 3WH was originally [105] designed to ensure a form of idempotence: if a packet
is retransmitted or duplicated in the network, it should not cause a connection to be
opened more than once. By challenging the client to echo back a pseudorandom num-
ber (the ISN), the 3WH verifies that the client’s request is still current.
We argue that this transport-layer idempotence is neither sufficient nor necessary
for applications’ needs. First, it is not sufficient by an end-to-end argument: transport-
layer idempotence does not ensure end-to-end idempotence. If a higher-layer entity
retries the request, such as when a human clicks on a link twice after the server appears
to respond slowly, the transaction may be executed twice. As a result, some web sites
resort to imploring the human user, “Do not click Submit twice!”
Second, transport-layer idempotence is not necessary: an application that desires
this property can simply perform a handshake at the higher layer. Moreover, many
applications do not need it. If a server delivers a web page twice a very small fraction
of the time, this is only a slight inefficiency, rather than a correctness problem.
1The client can include data with the first SYN packet. But if the server acts upon this data before
receiving the client’s ACK, then the functionality of the 3WH is nullified.
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Therefore, we argue that the benefit of ensuring idempotence in a general-purpose
transport protocol does not justify its cost in added delay. ASAP will however make
idempotence violations unlikely (§3.1.2.D).
B. Denial of Service Protection
The 3WH also lets the server s test the provenance of a client request from some source
IP c. The fact that the client is able to echo the server’s pseudorandom ISN, is a reliable
indicator that the client is located at c.
If the server completes requests without waiting for the 3WH, two DoS vulnera-
bilities emerge. First, the client could fabricate a large number of requests from many
spoofed IP addresses, making it difficult for the server to filter requests from a sin-
gle attacking client. Second and more critically, the attacker could perform reflec-
tion/amplification attacks : it sends relatively small requests with the source address
set to a victim’s address. The server then sends a larger amount of data to the victim,
thus amplifying the attacker’s power and hiding the origin of the attack.2
One could hope that ISP networks perform egress filtering to block source spoof-
ing. However, security is preserved only if all networks across the Internet choose to
perform filtering and do so without bugs. This idealistic assumption is false in prac-
tice [30].
We conclude that the DoS protection afforded by the 3WH is highly valuable. The
main goal of the rest of this section is to develop a protocol to verify source provenance
without introducing an RTT delay.
3.1.2 Verifying Provenance without a Handshake
ASAP leverages cryptographic proof to verify the provenance of client requests without
requiring an RTT delay on every connection. First, the client handshakes with a prove-
nance verifier (PV) to obtain a provenance certificate (PC). The PC corresponds
to cryptographic proof that the PV recently verified that the client was reachable at a
certain IP address. After obtaining this certificate once, the client can use it for mul-
tiple requests to place cryptographic proof of provenance in the request packet sent to
servers, in a way that avoids replay attacks.
This subsection presents our basic provenance verification protocol. Subsequently,
we will deal with two subtle problems: eavesdropping near the PV (§3.1.3) and mobil-
ity (§3.1.4). Fortunately, those two refinements only require changes to the process of
obtaining a PC.
A. Choosing a Provenance Verifier
The PV may be any party trusted by the server. We envision two common use cases.
First, the PV may simply be the web server itself, or a PV run by its domain at a
known location (pv.xyz.com). The first time a client contacts a domain, it obtains a
2Even with a 3WH, an attacker can reflect a SYN-ACK packet off a server, but no significant amplification
occurs.
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Figure 3.1: Key messages in the basic ASAP transport protocol. Obtaining a Provenance
Certificate when acquiring a certain IP address (messages 1 and 2); opening a transport
connection (message 3).
PC from the PV prior to initiating the application-level request to the server; thereafter,
it can contact the server directly. Thus, the first connection takes two RTTs (as in
TCP), and subsequent connections require a single RTT. This technique will be highly
effective for domains that attract the same client frequently (even if the specific server
varies each time), such as popular web sites or content distribution networks.
Second, one or more trusted third parties could run PV services. The advantage is
that a client can avoid an RTT delay for each new server or domain. The disadvantage
is that servers need to trust a third party. But this is not unprecedented: certificate
authorities and root DNS servers are examples in today’s Internet.
The above two solutions can exist in parallel. If the client uses a PV the server does
not trust, ASAP falls back to a 3WH and can use an appropriate PV for future requests.
B. Obtaining a Provenance Certificate
The protocol by which a client obtains a PC is shown in Fig. 3.1. Before beginning,
the client and PV have each generated a public/private key pair (Kcpub/ K
c
priv and
Kpvpub/K
pv
priv respectively) using a cryptosystem such as RSA. The client then sends
a request to the PV:
{Kcpub, dc}
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where dc is the duration for which the client requests that the PC be valid. The PV
replies with the PC:
PC = {Kcpub, ac, t, d}Kpvpriv .
Here ac is the source address of the client, t is the time PC becomes valid, and d is the
length of time PC will remain valid. The PV sets t to be the current time, and sets d
to the minimum of dc and the PV’s internal maximum time, perhaps 1 day (§3.1.4).
To verify provenance (§3.1.1.B), it is sufficient to use a single UDP message: while
it doesn’t prove to the PV that the client can receive messages at ac, the client can only
use the PC if it is able to receive it at ac. However, the PV itself is somewhat better
protected from DoS by using TCP, especially with SYN cookies, since this ensures that
the PV checks for address spoofing before it performs cryptographic functions (which
are expensive relative to sending a SYN-ACK).
C. Sending a Request
Once the client c has a current PC for its present location, it can contact a server and
include the PC in its request in order to bypass the 3WH.
However, a naı¨ve implementation including only the PC would allow anyone who
obtains the PC (an eavesdropper or a malicious server that c contacts) to use it to induce
any server to send data to c. To guard against this attack, c also constructs a request
certificate (RC) encrypted with its private key:
RC = {hash(meta, data), treq}Kcpriv .
Here hash is a secure hash function, meta is the message metadata (source and des-
tination IP address and port, protocol number, initial sequence number), data is the
application-level data (such as an HTTP request), and treq is the time the client sends
the request.
The client can now open a transport connection to the server with a message of the
form:
meta, PC,RC, data.
Upon receipt, the server verifies validity of the request. To do this, the server must
already know the public key of each PV that it trusts. It determines whether the PC
is valid for one of these3 by checking that it decrypts correctly, the current time lies
within [t, t + d], and ac matches the source address. If so, it uses the client’s public
key Kcpub from PC to check that RC decrypts correctly, the hash value in RC matches
hash(meta, data), and the time treq is recent, e.g., within the last 5 minutes. (This
timeout only needs to be long enough to cover most clock inaccuracy, which is on the
order of hundreds of milliseconds on NTP-enabled hosts, and packet transit time.)
If all these tests pass, then the request is accepted and the connection proceeds as
in TCP after the 3WH: data is passed to the application, and data (e.g., a web page)
3We expect the number of trusted PVs to be small, but to avoid iterating through each, the message could
simply include a short identifier for the relevantKpvpub.
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may be sent immediately back to the client. Thus, the client can receive results within
a single RTT.
D. Errors and Idempotence
In the protocol above, a number of errors can occur. Clocks at the PV, client, or server
could be out of sync so that certificates are rejected, or the PV chosen by the client may
not be trusted by the server. In these cases, we can simply fall back to a regular 3WH.
Another error case is sending of duplicate requests, most commonly when the client
retransmits after a timeout. There are several cases. If the server has not received the
request yet (e.g., the first was dropped), then it proceeds as in the protocol above. If
the server has already received the request and the connection is still active, then it
can realize this and simply ignore the duplicate. If the server has already received the
request but the connection is closed, it may believe the request is new, and pass the data
to the application.
The last case violates idempotence (§3.1.1.A). It is unlikely to occur in benign
cases: closing the connection requires receipt of a FIN packet from the client, which
it would only send after a retransmission of the original request, and even after that
the TCP stack enters the TIME WAIT state before finally clearing the connection after
a timeout. However, the server may receive the connection request after that due to
a replay attack. The server may choose to guard against such cases by remembering
hash values of recent requests. The server needs to maintain this state only for the RC
timeout period (5 minutes as specified above).
3.1.3 Eavesdropping Attacks and Defense
Thus far, determining the validity of a client’s address hinges on the client being able to
receive messages at a given address a. But in fact, this depends not only on the client’s
location, but also on from where the message is sent. If an attacker can eavesdrop on
any part of the path PV  a, then it can obtain a PC for a. In the same way, a client
can induce a TCP server s to send data to a if it can eavesdrop on any part of the path
s  a. Therefore, if the PV is colocated with the server, ASAP’s security (in this
sense) is equivalent to TCP’s.
But if a single PV is used by servers in many locations, the attack could be more
damaging. Consider, for example, a PV run by a globally-trusted third party. An
attacker who can eavesdrop on the PV’s network providers can obtain PCs for any
address, and these PCs are valid at every server in the Internet!
To defend against this attack, we use the following technique: the organization
running the PV service places PV servers in several diverse locations; the client must
successfully handshake with all of them to obtain a PC. In this case, the attacker would
need to eavesdrop on all paths PV1  a, PV2  a, PV3  a, traversing diverse
geographical locations. Intuitively, the attacker has either compromised many networks
or is in fact physically close to a. Note that this change only requires modification of the
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protocol between the client and the PV, with no changes to the PC format or interaction
between client and server.
But how many PVs are necessary, where should they be placed, and how much
(quantitatively) can the eavesdropping attack be limited? We give two answers to this
question.
First, in the Appendix, we prove that O(k log n) PVs are sufficient (though perhaps
not necessary) to defend against an attacker that can eavesdrop on k nodes in an n-node
network, even if the attacker can choose those nodes after knowing the PV locations.
Specifically, we show that for nearly all possible PV placements, for every client c,
either: (1) the attacker cannot impersonate c in ASAP, or (2) the attacker might be able
to impersonate c but even in TCP, the attacker could fool at least half of the Internet
into believing that it is c.
Second, in §3.5, we show that the situation is even better in practice. In real-world
networks, even with 2 PVs, for the large majority of PV placements ASAP provides
better protection against a worst-case eavesdropping attacker than TCP.
3.1.4 Dealing with Mobility
In our basic protocol, PCs remain valid for a fixed timeout, such as 1 day. The fixed
timeout may be suitable for many applications. In some cases, however, a client may
be authorized to use a source IP for only a short duration, perhaps because it is mobile,
and we may wish to bound the duration of invalid use of a PC.
Suppose a client is authorized to use an IP address only for time period [t, t + T ].
The difficulty is that the PV does not know T . A simple approach would be to pick a
fixed PC timeout d. This results in a tradeoff: d is short and the client has to contact the
PV frequently (T/d times); or d is long and invalid use of the PC could last arbitrarily
longer than T .
However, we can do much better with an adaptive expiration time. The following
protocol guarantees that the duration of invalid use is ≤ T +O(1) with only log2 T −
O(1) requests sent to the PV. The protocol extends our basic client-to-PV protocol
(again without any changes to the PC format or client-to-server protocol). The first
time the client contacts the PV, the PV issues a certificate for a short duration d0, e.g.,
30 minutes. Just before this PC expires, the client requests another, with a refresh
option where it includes its old PC in the message to the PV. The PV verifies that the
old PC is valid and current, and if so, issues a PC with duration twice that of the old PC.
This is then repeated, and guarantees that the client will be certified to use the address
only during [t, t+max(2T, d0)] with dlog2(T/d0)e requests sent to the PV. In practice,
there would likely be a maximum duration as well (e.g., 1 month). Note that the PV
remains stateless.
3.1.5 Additional Security Properties
Replay attacks: Assuming the private keys and the secure hash function are not
compromised, an eavesdropper that has heard every message has few options for replay
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attacks. Specifically, even knowing a PC for a client, the attacker cannot create a novel
valid RC. It can only replay existing RCs for a limited amount of time (e.g. 5 minutes,
using the timeout above), which can be filtered by the server (§3.1.2.D).
DoS attacks on servers: ASAP introduces cryptographic overhead on servers, which
could be exploited to perform DoS attacks. The worst case would be that a large num-
ber of hosts present valid PCs but invalid RCs to the server. In our implementation
(§3.4), the server would be forced to perform one RSA 1024 verification, and one RSA
512 verification before declaring the request to be invalid.
Although ASAP increases the amount of work the attacker can force the server to
do with a single packet, this attack has an easy defense: if a server detects that it is
under attack and cannot handle the rate of requests, it can simply fall back to standard
TCP handshaking. The attack thus only causes a single-RTT increase in latency rather
than a service outage; thus, the attack may have limited value to attackers.
We also note ASAP’s extra computation overhead is partially compensated for by
slightly reduced resources: (1) the server sends and receives one fewer packet than in
the 3WH, and (2) as in TCP with SYN cookies, it avoids storing state for half-open
connections. Finally, ASAP’s computational overhead could be decreased in future
implementations with a faster cryptographic algorithm, such as elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy (ECC) [61].
Key compromise: If the client’s key Kcpriv is compromised (e.g., if the client is in-
fected with a bot) this will expose only the client to DoS attacks. An attacker can then
impersonate the client and mount reflection attacks, but only directed to the compro-
mised client.
The more serious problem is if the PV’s keys are compromised. If the PV is run
on a per-domain basis, it can simply discard its old keys and create new ones. If the
PV is a trusted third party, servers that trusted it will have to be made aware of the
compromise and remove the PV from their list of trusted PVs. Similar problems are
also encountered in web Certificate Authorities [92] and similar solutions apply here.
Privacy: ASAP clients might be easily tracked across requests and across locations,
since each request includes the client’s public key. However, the client can simply
change its (arbitrary) public key when it changes its IP address and obtains a new PC,
thus providing privacy that is essentially equivalent to today.
3.2 Fast Name Resolution
To reduce delay, ASAP piggybacks transport connection establishment atop the DNS
lookup process. The intuition is that once the client’s request reaches a DNS server that
knows the web server’s IP address, forwarding the message directly will be faster than
going via the “triangle route” from the DNS to the client to the server, which occurs
today.
In general, this shortcutting will save up to 1 RTTs, depending on the location of
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Figure 3.2: Timeline for TCP and three variants of ASAP.
the DNS server that knows the server’s IP address.4
In realizing this idea, our key goal is deployability. The procedure described here
requires changes only at resources under control of the client and the server interested
in using the protocol: the client, the server, and the authoritative DNS server (ADNS).
3.3 Basic Protocol
In ASAP (Figure 3.2b), if the client does not have the server’s IP address, it first con-
structs a DNS query. In the query, it inserts connection establishment information
CI . Specifically, CI is a sequence of bytes encoding meta, PC,RC, data as de-
scribed in §3.1.2.C. ASAP does not modify the format of or add fields to the DNS
query. Instead, we encode the connection establishment information into the hostname
field of the DNS request, concatenated with the hostname being looked up. For exam-
ple, if the client is looking up www.xyz.com, it would generate a DNS request for
a.CI.www.xyz.com, where a is an arbitrary character which will not appear in the
normal name (e.g., ASCII code 13), used by ASAP to determine if the request is from
an ASAP-enabled client or a legacy client.
Since CI is unique, the local DNS (LDNS) will not have the name cached, and
will route the client’s query towards the ADNS for xyz.com. The ADNS (which
4The Internet occasionally violates the triangle inequality [95]. This could either lessen or heighten
ASAP’s benefit. Our evaluation will show shortcutting offers significant improvement in practice.
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supports ASAP) strips off the CI field and sends CI , which carries the address of the
client, spoofed by the DNS server, to the server. The server then responds directly
back to the client with the requested object using the ASAP transport protocol (§3.1).
Since the LDNS is still waiting for a response, the ADNS also returns an A record
mapping a.CI.www.xyz.com to the web server’s IP address. This response is given
a small TTL since caching it will be useless for future requests (as CI is unique for
each request).
While Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0) [108] enable the use of long
names, to be compatible with older DNS servers, the total size of the hostname field
in the query should remain below 253 bytes. In our implementation meta, PC,RC
occupies a total of 212 bytes, leaving 41 bytes for the actual hostname and application
data. This would be enough space for retrieving HTTP objects that do not require long
parameters from the client. Specifically, the server can choose short hostnames and
compressed pathnames for web objects (i.e., a URL like www.xyz.com/bX4r could
be mapped by the web server to a longer pathname). However, some HTTP requests
may require long client-specific parameters. At a minimum, the server will receive the
first line of the HTTP request, which includes the URL [?]; conceivably, servers can
decide individually whether they have enough information to act on the request (e.g.
setting parameters to default values), or must wait for more data. Moreover, crypto-
graphic algorithms using smaller key size for an equivalent amount of security, such as
ECC [61], could be leveraged to provide more room for the application data.
Making this scheme practical requires solving two more problems below.
3.3.1 Handling DNS Caching via Multiple Queries
Unfortunately, embedding CI into the requested hostname presents problems for DNS
caching, which DNS uses to improve latency and scalability. In the basic protocol
described above, ASAP prevents caching because CI , and thus the hostname, varies
across every connection. If the client’s LDNS (where we are particularly interested in
caching) supports ASAP, then it can simply strip off CI from the name. However, in
practice, ASAP may not be supported at all LDNS servers.
To address this, ASAP clients also generate a second DNS request (Figure 3.2(c)),
for the original hostname (www.xyz.com), to cause that hostname to be cached at the
LDNS. The cached entry can then be used by ASAP clients (to avoid intermediate DNS
lookups), as well as non-ASAP clients (to directly lookup the remote server). As an
optimization, upon receiving a response to the second DNS request, if the ASAP client
has not yet received a response from the server, the ASAP client immediately sends its
CI request directly to the server’s IP address. This can speed ASAP connections for
cases where the remote server’s IP address is locally cached. Note that this optimization
can cause multiple copies of the request to reach the server; but this case is functionally
equivalent to the client retransmitting after a timeout, which the ASAP server (like a
TCP server) must handle anyway, by ignoring the duplicate.
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3.3.2 Reducing Latency with Server-side DNS
One remaining shortcoming of ASAP is that all queries must traverse a single ADNS.
This increases load on the ADNS, and increases latency for sites that replicate content
across the wide area to place it near users.
To address this, ASAP embeds some DNS functionality into the web servers. In
particular, each ASAP-enabled server can run a Server DNS (SDNS), which performs
similar functionality to the ADNS but is co-located with the server. When the ADNS is
first queried, it responds to the LDNS with an NS record mapping www.xyz.com to
the SDNS, and an A record mapping the SDNS to the server’s IP address. Thereafter,
the LDNS will map requests of the form a.CI.www.xyz .com directly to the SDNS,
and thus to the server, avoiding the ADNS.
The SDNS can be implemented as an extension to the web server that decapsulates
the ASAP query, to avoid running an additional process. Also note that the service
provider can perform standard load balancing and redirection by choosing which SDNS
IP address to return (e.g., one physically near the requesting client).
3.4 Implementation
Fast transport connection establishment: We implemented two versions of ASAP’s
transport layer. First, we built an application-layer implementation using UDT (version
4.8) [21], a reliable and congestion aware UDP-based transport protocol. We modified
UDT to implement our fast transport connection establishment protocol (§3.1) by (a)
adding a new connect interface on the client side that, in addition to taking the socket
descriptor as input, also takes the domain name, certificates, and application data; (b)
adding a new pre-fetch interface on the server side, which lets the server begin imme-
diately transmitting data upon establishment of the connection. For ASAP’s crypto-
graphic operations, we used SHA-256 for hash and 1024-bit RSA, as implemented in
OpenSSL [16] version 1.0.0c.
To compare more precisely to TCP, we built a second implementation of ASAP
within Linux kernel 2.6.38.4. The client sends a special SYN message carrying con-
nection information and data; the server’s kernel validates provenance and passes the
data to the application immediately. Note that this special SYN is compliant with TCP.
By adding an ASAP option in the kernel and setting it to true, the special SYN message
is allowed to have a data section, instead of only a header as in typical SYN messages.
Since we could not directly make use of OpenSSL in kernel space, and since no asym-
metric cryptographic algorithm is included in the standard release of the Linux kernel,
we ported and modified an RSA patch [17] for Linux kernel 2.6.21, and incorporated
the cryptographic part of the design as a kernel module.
The fast transport connection implementation may be run alone, or to further reduce
delay, may be run jointly with our fast name resolution implementation.
Fast name resolution: We implemented ASAP’s fast name resolution as a set of
extensions to the Unbound DNS server version 1.4.8. This code forms the foundation
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for the ADNS and the SDNS operations. We run unmodified Unbound as the LDNS
and intermediate DNS servers in our experiments.
3.5 Evaluation
We evaluated our implementation of ASAP in a PlanetLab deployment, a local de-
ployment with emulated latency, and microbenchmarks (§3.5.1). Overall, we find that
ASAP can reduce transmission time by up to two round trips, significantly reducing
latency of short web traffic (§3.6). However, ASAP also has computational overhead
for cryptographic processing; we show this is manageable (§3.7). Finally, we show that
using just two PVs effectively limits eavesdropping attacks (§3.7.1).
3.5.1 Methodology
We chose 24 representative PlanetLab nodes to act as clients and servers: 18 domes-
tic nodes (UIUC, UCLA, UPenn and so on) and 6 international nodes (Brazil, New
Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Zurich). The RTTs among these 24 nodes range
from 3 ms to 440 ms. Each client was assigned a LDNS, in the same site as the client.
Similarly, the server’s ADNS was placed at another PlanetLab node located in the same
site as the server. We also tried placing the ADNS server on more distant nodes to see
how much influence this variation causes to the performance of our design. Unless
otherwise mentioned, the client downloads 11.18KB of data, the median size of data
downloaded from per single host per connection according to [12], during the connec-
tion.
We implemented the transport component of ASAP as extensions to UDT. We com-
pare against an unmodified implementation of UDT, and unmodified TCP. We imple-
mented the name resolution component of ASAP as extensions to the Unbound DNS
server, and use an unmodified copy of Unbound as a baseline. We targeted a design
with low complexity, resulting in an implementation with relatively few lines of code
(less than 3000 for name resolution, transport, client/server, and provenance verifica-
tion functions).
3.6 Latency Reduction
In this section, we study the latency of ASAP. We define the latency savings ratio
(LSR) as the time it takes ASAP to download an object divided by the time it takes
today’s Internet to download the object (using UDT or TCP).
Overall latency: We first evaluate the complete ASAP protocol. We consider two
separate cases: (a) the server’s IP is already cached on the LDNS, and (b) the server’s
IP is not cached, requiring a lookup to traverse to the server’s ADNS. We achieve the
first case by sending an initial request to “warm up” the cache before collecting results.
For the first case (Figure 3.3a), the latency savings ratio is similar to the transport-
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Figure 3.3: Overall download time, when DNS caching is (a) enabled, bypassing the ADNS;
(b) disabled, with the ADNS colocated with the server; and (c) disabled, with the ADNS in
a random location.
24
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  50  100  150  200  250  300  350
fra
ct
io
n 
of
 tr
ia
ls
time (ms)
 
ASAP
TCP
(a) CDF of total delay for 11.18 KB download
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
 1  10  100  1000
tim
e 
(m
s)
file size (KB)
TCP
ASAP
(b) median total delay for sizes 1KB to 500KB
Figure 3.4: Latency improvement of ASAP’s transport layer, kernel implementation, ex-
cluding name resolution.
only experiments. For the second case (Figure 3.3b), ASAP can save up to two RTTs,
resulting in more significant latency reduction.
Finally, since the ADNS may not always be near the server, we perform an exper-
iment where we place the ADNS server at a random site (Figure 3.3c). We find that
ASAP can still reduce latency in this case: even if the ADNS and server are not colo-
cated, it is generally faster to go directly from ADNS to server, rather than from ADNS
to client to server.
Transport latency: To understand the benefits of ASAP’s connection setup proce-
dure, we microbenchmark only its transport operations (including connection setup,
requesting the web page, and data transmission delays). Figure 3.4 shows transport
latency as compared to TCP in the kernel.
Here, we use two virtual machines on one physical machine acting as the client and
the server respectively. We use [15] to add latency between the two virtual machines,
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making the RTT between them roughly 100ms. The client downloads 11.18KB data,
as in the previous evaluation. Figure 3.4a shows the CDFs of ASAP’s and TCP’s trans-
mission time over 1000 trials. The results confirm a significant reduction in latency.
ASAP nearly always achieves one RTT reduction in latency (100ms) as compared to
standard TCP. We then vary the file size from 1KB to 500KB, and run each case over
200 trials. Figure 3.4b shows the median values of total delay. ASAP achieves lower
latency in all cases.
3.7 Computational Overhead
ASAP adds some additional computational overhead to several parts of today’s Inter-
net, including clients, web servers, DNS servers; and the new infrastructure we deploy,
the Provenance Verifier. To characterize overhead of each of these components, we
instrumented our implementation with code to measure the (a) pass-through time, i.e.,
the time from when a packet was received to when it was processed and forwarded, and
(b) microbenchmarks, to characterize what fraction of overheads were due to crypto-
graphic processing. We collected our experiments on a single core of a 2.83GHz Intel
Core 2 Quad Q9550 processor with 4GB RAM.
Provenance Verifier: Each request to the PV requires a private encryption to generate
a PC. We would like the overhead at the PV to be low, to reduce the number of PVs,
by enabling each PV to service a larger number of clients. Figure 3.5 shows a CDF of
the PV’s per-request processing time with a 1024-bit RSA key, over 1000 trials. We
find that more than 95% of certification requests can be processed in less than 0.8ms.
Assuming each client needs to renew a PV once per day, a single PV server with a
single core could handle several tens of millions of clients.
Client: There are two key sources of overhead at clients: the time spent commu-
nicating with the PV, and the time spent communicating with the server. The for-
mer happens rarely — it is done when the client obtains a new IP address (e.g. via
DHCP), and therefore does not affect the latency associated with connection setup (ex-
cept for connections initiated immediately after obtaining a new address). To evaluate
the amount of overhead ASAP introduces when communicating with the server, we
perform microbenchmarks (Figure 3.5). ASAP’s overhead at the client was dominated
by cryptographic operations, namely, the encryption operations involved in construct-
ing the request certificate (RC). However, this overhead was typically on the order of
1-2ms, substantially less than typical round-trip times.
DNS servers: ASAP increases DNS overhead in two ways. First, the client sends
two queries to DNS, which could double its workload in the worst case (if entries are
cached, this overhead could be substantially reduced). Second, the ADNS does addi-
tional processing on packet contents: it removes the ASAP component of the request
before processing and caching the appropriate information, then replaces the ASAP
component before forwarding the response back to the LDNS. To evaluate this over-
head, we performed an experiment where the client sends 1000 requests to the server.
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Figure 3.5: Cryptographic overhead.
We found that overhead increased by on the order of 100 microseconds at the LDNS
and the ADNS. However, this overhead is small compared to the total packet process-
ing delay in Unbound (0.7 ms on average).
Web server: An ASAP-enabled web server performs an RSA verification of the
message before processing it. We measure this overhead in Figure 3.5. Here, we made
a client running in the UCLA PlanetLab site send 1000 requests to the ASAP-enabled
web server. The median time required to perform the verification operations on a single
request is 0.326ms, the mean is 0.359ms, and the 95th percentile is 0.462ms. This
is significantly less than typical RTTs, so although it does add some computational
overhead, ASAP would provide a large benefit in end-to-end delay.
3.7.1 PV Eavesdropping Defense
Recall (§3.1.3) that TCP and ASAP have differing security with respect to eavesdrop-
ping. Call a client-server pair (c, s) attackable if an attacker can induce s to accept
an incoming transport connection and send data to c. In TCP, (c, s) is attackable if the
attacker can observe messages sent from s to c (either because it is truly located at c,
or because it is eavesdropping). In ASAP, in the worst case of a globally trusted PV,
(c, s) is attackable for any s if the attacker can observe messages sent from the PV to
c.
Here we evaluate empirically the efficacy of using multiple PVs, such that (c, s) is
attackable only if the attacker can observe messages from all PVs to c. We begin with
a network map and a set of routes. We pick locations for one or more PVs, and then
find the worst location for a single-site eavesdropper — i.e., the site that maximizes the
number of attackable pairs (c, s) given the PV locations. We then iterate this for many
PV locations. Finally, we perform a similar worst-case attackability calculation for
TCP, which is equivalent to maximizing betweenness centrality in the given network.
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Figure 3.6: CDF (over PV locations) of the percent of IP addresses that are attackable in
ASAP, based on Route Views routing data.
We first study the attackability for ASAP in the Internet based on actual routes
observed in Route Views [93]. This data set includes routes from a limited set (about
26) of vantage points, to all destination IP addresses in the Internet; the PVs are chosen
from those locations, as are servers for TCP. We allow the attacker to eavesdrop on any
path that traverses one single (adversarially-chosen) autonomous system.
Fig. 3.6 shows attackability (i.e., fraction of attacked client-server pairs) on the x
axis; the y axis is a CDF over possible PV locations. One PV is vulnerable to the
attacker, who can simply eavesdrop on the PV’s AS. However, the attacker’s effec-
tiveness is reduced dramatically for two PVs. Further PVs offer diminishing returns,
asymptoting to 4.9% attackability. In contrast, TCP’s attackability is 24%, and even
when the attacker is prevented from eavesdropping on a tier-1 AS, this only falls to
9.84%.
Table 3.1 shows results for two PVs in additional topologies: six ISP networks,
as measured by Rocketfuel [102], in which we assume routes follow shortest paths;
CAIDA’s AS-level map of the Internet [40], in which we assume routes follow common
customer/provider/peer policies; and the Route Views data with and without the tier 1
ASes being attackable.
These results show that for an attacker who can eavesdrop on one worst-case site,
two PVs are sufficient to limit the attackability. In particular, even if two PVs are placed
randomly, the chance that ASAP has fewer attackable client-server pairs than TCP is
at least 75% in all topologies we tested. Moreover, the PVs can be intentionally placed
in two topologically-diverse, and therefore better-than-random, locations.
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Topology ASAP TCP Chance
(best PVs) ASAP
better
AS 1221 15.38% 39.43% 83.37%
AS 1239 2.20% 17.80% 84.98%
AS 1755 5.75% 28.55% 77.65%
AS 3257 6.21% 28.81% 75.30%
AS 3967 3.80% 37.76% 91.50%
AS 6461 4.35% 44.65% 88.04%
AS-level Internet 1.64% 17.72% 87.56%
Route Views 4.89% 23.61% 91.41%
Route Views w/o T1 4.89% 9.84% 93.88%
Table 3.1: Attackability of TCP and ASAP with two PVs. The columns are the topology,
attackability of ASAP with optimally-placed PVs, attackability of TCP, and the chance that
ASAP’s attackability is less than TCP’s if the PVs are placed randomly.
3.8 Deployment
Like most new transport and naming protocols, our design requires changes to certain
clients and servers. However, ASAP can be deployed in an incremental and end-to-end
manner, with even a single client-server pair realizing benefits. We next describe the
requisite changes at participating clients, servers, and the server’s ADNS.
ADNS: Since the ADNS is typically owned and operated by the service provider, many
deployed systems (e.g., Akamai) leverage the ADNS as an easy-to-modify location
to place new functionality. Our implementation of ASAP consists of some simple
extensions to software running at the ADNS.
End host clients: We require modifications to the client’s TCP implementation. A
key question is whether this is deployable in a backwards-compatible manner, so clients
interacting with legacy servers will simply fall back to TCP. One option is the strategy
of our implementation: include the certificates in the data portion of the SYN packet.
This is likely to work well in practice since most current TCP implementations discard
this data; but technically it could be unsafe because legacy servers that do use SYN
data would misinterpret our certificates as application data. Another option is to put
the certificates in a TCP option, as in TCP Fast Open [89]. However, for this we would
need more space for options, as proposed in [49].
To avoid changing end host network stacks, applications could use ASAP on top
of UDP, as in our modification of UDT [21]. To avoid modifying end hosts entirely,
ASAP could be deployed at web proxies and caches.
Server: Like the client host, the server should be modified with extensions to sup-
port the ASAP protocol. If desired, ASAP could also be deployed as a reverse proxy,
to avoid the need to modify servers; however, we note that service providers already
commonly customize their operating system and web server implementations.
PVs: Note that ASAP does not require deployment of a shared PV infrastructure.
Such a deployment scenario would be useful and could arise, but in an initial deploy-
ment each organization could host its own PVs, thus requiring little coordination. This
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deployment is likely to bring large benefits for content distribution networks and other
large content providers.
DNSSEC instead of PVs: An alternative to verifying source addresses with PVs is to
use DNSSEC’s [31, 33, 32] designated signer (DS), public key (DNSKEY), and sig-
nature (RRSIG) records to certify ownership of IP addresses via reverse DNS lookup,
as in [74]. The server would verify the chain of certificates from the root of the DNS
hierarchy to the client. Servers could cache some of these records near the top of the
hierarchy, while the client would provide others in its request. This leads to a tradeoff:
placing more records in the query increases its size, which is already constrained (par-
ticularly when piggybacked within DNS queries); but if we require the server to cache
more levels of the hierarchy of certificates, it will lead to cache misses and the server
will need to query the DNSKEY records from corresponding DNS servers, increasing
delay. In addition, compared with our PV design, using DNSSEC may be more diffi-
cult to deploy, as it requires each client’s local ISP to issue certificates of IP ownership
to the client.
Leveraging accountable Internet architectures: While ASAP does not require ex-
tensive changes to the Internet, it can benefit from deployment of previously proposed
clean-slate designs. For example, systems that cryptographically certify location or
ownership of IP addresses [27, 74] may obviate the need to run PVs.
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Chapter 4
Halfback: Running Short Flows
Quickly and Safely
4.1 Background
4.1.1 Design Goals and Rationale
Rate control for short flows should be deployable, low latency, and safe. We discuss
each goal and its corresponding implication on design rationale of latency optimization
for short flows.
(1) Deployability: Mechanisms that require changes in routers and the TCP protocol
have proven hard to deploy. Software changes within senders and receivers require less
coordination among parties. We focus in particular on sender-side changes only, since
significant senders (major service providers like Google or Amazon) have centralized
control over their deployments, and have an incentive to change because even hundreds
of milliseconds affect user behavior and revenue. For example, [7] observed major
content providers enlarging their initial congestion window, and we observed an 8-
segment ICW in use at google.com.
(2) Low Latency: The first requirement to achieve low latency is aggressive startup.
Even with some historical hints, a sender will not be able to perfectly predict the ap-
propriate rate for a new flow since it lacks real-time visibility into the end-to-end path.
Nor will it have time to gradually learn the rate, as in TCP. Therefore, low-latency flows
have to be aggressive in the sense of starting with a sending rate that will occasionally
turn out to be higher than the steady-state.
Second, we need fast recovery from packet loss. Even one RTT spent detecting
packet loss is undesirable. TCP uses fast retransmission and SACK to respond to loss.
However, senders still need to wait at least one RTT after a loss, or even more if pack-
ets are lost at the end of the flow. Some algorithms [53] use erasure coding but this
requires a new protocol and increases the difficulty of deployment. Thus, to respond
to loss more quickly than one RTT, we need to implement some form of proactive
retransmission which retransmits packets even before receiving a signal of loss.
Finally, a scheme which achieves low latency should be minimally affected by
bufferbloat. Bufferbloat caused by large buffers in routers increases RTT by increasing
queuing delay. One can mitigate the effect of bufferbloat by finishing transmission in
fewer RTTs.
(3) Safety: An aggressive mechanism can easily cause a series of problems. First, as
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Figure 4.1: CDF of fraction of traffic carried by different size of flows using measurements
from [88] [35] [59]
TCP is a conservative protocol, the aggressive mechanism can damage the competing
(short and long) TCP flows. Second, as the aggressive startup phase has a high initial
sending rate, this can even cause problems for other aggressive flows. Finally, proac-
tive retransmission needs extra bandwidth which can increase network utilization and
cause the onset of performance collapse at lower utilization than TCP. In summary, a
safe aggressive mechanism should avoid congestion collapse in the range of realistic
network utilization, be TCP friendly and incur limited bandwidth overhead.
There is hope, however, that with a well-designed mechanism, more aggressive
start-up can be safe and avoid Internet-wide catastrophic effects. TCP is very conser-
vative for short flows when it faces this tradeoff. At the same time, the average network
utilization is typically around 20% to 30% in the Internet (based on 2003 measurements
of backbone links [55]). Fig. 4.1 shows a CDF of the fraction of traffic carried by a
range of flow sizes in several networks. In the measurements labeled “Internet” from
a Tier-1 ISP, only 34.7% of bytes were carried by flows smaller than 141KB [88] even
though more than 95% [25] of web transfers are smaller than this size. Furthermore,
as noted in a recent forecast report [4], by 2019, video streaming traffic will comprise
more than 80% of global Internet traffic. Therefore, start-up phase optimization mech-
anisms with carefully tuned aggressiveness for the small portion of very short flows
probably will not severely overload the Internet as a whole. This kind of optimization
is also likely to be applicable to data center networks. In measurements at a private [35]
and a public [59] data center, less than 1% of transmitted bytes were in flows smaller
than 141KB. Therefore even Proactive TCP [53], which doubles the workload created
by short flows, only increases network utilization by 0.2% to 10.4% (i.e., 20% · 1% to
30% · 34.7%) in these environments when applied to flows smaller than 141KB.
4.1.2 Overview of Existing Solutions
Several works have developed approaches deployable at end-hosts which aim to reduce
latency for short flows. PCP [28] uses packet-trains to measure available bandwidth
and sets its sending rate at measured rate. However, the probes take time and can
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yield inaccurate (often too conservative) results on very small samples, resulting in
unacceptably long FCT. Our experiments with PCP showed that it can have higher
flow completion time than TCP.
Reactive TCP [53] uses a probe timeout (PTO) to retransmit the last packet as
a probe, thus avoiding the longer retransmission timeout (RTO). However, this does
not solve the problem that the starting phase is too conservative in TCP and can only
mitigate the effect of packet loss in the case of tail loss. TCP-10 simply increases initial
congestion window to 10. It does achieve better latency performance, but as we will
see in § 4.3, it is still to conservative for just transmitting short flows. Proactive TCP
transmits two copies of every packet in a short flow and unsurprisingly incurs severe
safety problems as its latency performance collapses even with relatively low network
utilization.
Our experiments showed that the existing proposal which achieves lowest flow
completion time, at least in low-utilization scenarios, is JumpStart [75]. JumpStart
accelerates short flows by transmitting the entire flow in one RTT. This is done with
packet pacing, so that packet transmissions are evenly spaced across this single RTT.
However, after the first batch of data is paced out, JumpStart falls back to normal TCP
with bursty and reactive-only retransmission. JumpStart is effective if all packets get
successfully pushed through the network. However, very commonly, some packets in
the first batch are dropped. When that happens, JumpStart has two problems. First,
it relies on TCP’s reactive packet loss detection and has to wait at least one RTT to
recover. Second, and more significantly, JumpStart uses TCP’s retransmission mecha-
nism and will aggressively burst out all lost packets and will often incur even more loss.
This bursty retransmission mechanism gives it significantly worse flow-level safety
compared to TCP-family solutions. Our experiments show JumpStart [75] has perfor-
mance collapse when short flows drive the network utilization to around 50%. This
unsatisfying flow-level safety property actually translates to even worse application-
level latency performance because web page requests usually involve multiple concur-
rent short flows, magnifying the packet loss problem by creating a brief transient high
utilization scenario. Indeed, when using real webpage request patterns, JumpStart’s
application-level performance begins to collapse (i.e., it becomes worse than TCP’s) at
network utilization of 30%.
As mentioned in 4.1.1, inevitably, aggressive startup phases will sometimes choose
too high of a rate. The above discussion of JumpStart illustrates that it’s easy to
send data quickly but the trickiest part of the problem is how to best handle the in-
evitable over-shoots. Furthermore, the application-level results illustrate that an indi-
vidual sender should want to do this not only to help other sender’s flows, but also to
reduce interference among its own flows.
4.2 Halfback Design
Measurement and analysis suggest that we should design a protocol with an aggressive
initial packet sending phase and intelligent proactive packet retransmission phase that
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reduces latency and also limits aggressiveness to improve safety. We propose Halfback
to realize this design rationale with two mechanisms: Pacing and Reverse-Ordered
Proactive Retransmission. The Pacing phase follows past work in that it delivers data
quickly, but may incur higher loss rate; the ROPR phase recovers from that potential
loss effectively with limited aggressiveness in retransmission.
4.2.1 Pacing Phase
After the three-way handshake, the sender has acquired the flow control window size
advertised by the receiver, and a sample RTT. Halfback’s first data transmission phase
then begins. The fastest way to transmit the data is simply in one immediate burst at
line rate. However, this arbitrarily large sending rate may harm the existing flows and
increase packet loss. Instead, we borrow a technique from JumpStart [75]: we pace
out all the data in one RTT. Compared to sending in an immediate burst, this method
adds at most one RTT (for a total of two) but bounds the transmission rate so there is
significantly lower chance of a burst of packet losses, which is good for all flows on
the network.
In addition, we also give an upper bound of the data transmitted which can be used
to bound the transmission rate. This upper bound equals the minimum of the flow
control window size, flow size, and a Pacing Threshold. If the flow size exceeds this
bound, Halfback falls back to TCP (§4.2.3). The application designers could simply
set Halfback’s Pacing Threshold to a constant value that would be sufficient to transmit
most small web objects. In our experiments, we use a threshold of 141KB which can
cover more than 95% [25] of web transfers. Another option, not evaluated here, is to set
the threshold to the largest throughput observed on recent connections, times the RTT
derived from the three-way handshake. This setting efficiently avoids a too-aggressive
startup phase.
4.2.2 Reverse-ordered Proactive Retransmission (ROPR) Phase
After completing the Pacing Phase, Halfback proactively begins protecting itself from
packets that may have been lost. The basic idea is that in addition to normal packet
retransmission, Halfback proactively retransmits the flow’s packets, but does so in re-
verse order and at the same rate that it receives ACKs from the previous phase. This
proactive retransmission helps Halfback quickly recover from loss while limiting im-
pact on other flows. To better understand this scheme, we explain the design rationale
for each aspect of this ROPR phase: starting time, retransmission rate, and the order in
which to retransmit packets.
We choose to start this phase when the sender receives the first ACK after the
Pacing phase. Due to inaccurate estimation of RTT, ACKs can be received before the
pacing phase finishes. In that case, ACKs will not trigger proactive retransmission
until all new packets are paced out. This avoids competition between the paced and
retransmitted packets. It also allows the sender to do some useful work — whereas in
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standard TCP, having transmitted all the data, the sender would simply be idle waiting
for ACKs.
For the retransmission rate, we use the rate at which the sender receives ACKs.
In contrast to TCP and JumpStart, which can send a burst of (reactive) retransmit-
ted packets, this (proactive) ACK-based retransmission better approximates the current
available bandwidth of the bottleneck link. That is, roughly speaking, for each one of
the paced packets that leaves the bottleneck queue, we send one proactively retrans-
mitted packet. As a result, we avoid affecting other flows, and significantly reduce the
probability that the retransmitted packets are lost again which helps the sender avoid
timeout and reduces bandwidth overhead.
The design decisions above specify when and how we can proactively retransmit
a packet; but which packet do we send each time we have the chance? The goal here
is to quickly recover from any packet loss caused by the aggressive startup phase. As
we are retransmitting proactively, we don’t know which packets are lost; so Halfback
tries to proactively retransmit packets in decreasing order of the probability they were
lost. When the Pacing phase sends a large amount of data in a short period, the packets
at the end of the flow have a higher probability of overflowing a bottleneck queue and
being lost than the packets at the beginning. Thus, in ROPR, the sender proactively
retransmits packets in reverse order. When combined with the fact that ROPR matches
the rate of ACKs from the Pacing Phase, this means that in the typical case, the ACKs
(moving forward) will meet the retransmissions (moving backward) in the middle of
the flow. Thus, ROPR typically retransmits only 50% of the short flow—hence the
name Halfback—which means that it will only increase network utilization by 0.1% to
5.2% in the typical network environments mentioned in §4.1.1.
RC3 [79] uses a seemingly similar mechanism that transmits packets in reverse or-
der in its Recursive Low Priority (RLP) control loop. However, we want to highlight
that RC3’s reverse-ordered transmission is totally different from Halfback in terms of
when, how and why. RLP transmits reversed-ordered packets at line rate, and it does
so concurrently with TCP’s normal forward-ordered packet transmission. More impor-
tantly, RC3 requires in-network changes to transmit the reverse ordered packets to a
lower priority queue in the network. RC3 uses reverse ordering to avoid transmitting
the same packet for both primary control loop and RLP control loop, whereas Halfback
use it for proactive recovery from packet loss.
4.2.3 Falling Back to TCP
Aggressive transmission is not useful for long flows, where overhead would have
greater impact and flow completion time is less critical. Without information about
exact flow sizes, Halfback needs a mechanism to fall back to normal TCP for long
flows. A practical solution is to transmit aggressively for the first k bytes, effectively
the Pacing Threshold discussed in §4.2.1, and then fall back to TCP. Halfback will suc-
cessfully deliver the first k bytes of the flow using its Pacing and ROPR phases, and
then will fall back to TCP with a congestion window of s ·RTT , where s is estimated
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Figure 4.2: Halfback transmits a 10-packet flow
from arriving ACKs during the ROPR phase. Other bandwidth estimation mechanisms
can also be used [65, 104].
4.2.4 Example
In this section, we walk through an example 10-segment flow transmitted by Halfback.
Fig. 4.2 shows the whole process. In the first RTT, Halfback’s Pacing phase, the sender
paces out all the ten segments in one RTT. When it receives the first ACK, the sender
enters Halfback’s ROPR phase to proactively recover from potential packet loss. In
this phase, for each ACK received, the sender will proactively retransmit one unACKed
packet in reverse order: it receives ACK 1, and retransmits packet 10; it receives ACK
2 and retransmits packet 9; and so on, until it receives ACK 5 and retransmits packet 6.
Next, the sender receives ACK 6. At this point, all the unACKed packets have already
been proactively retransmitted, and the sender leaves ROPR phase.
As shown in Fig 4.2, the first transmission of packet 9 was dropped because the
aggressive startup phase overflowed the router buffer. But Halfback proactively re-
transmitted the packet during the ROPR phase and thus recovered from the loss before
being notified of it. In contrast, a normal TCP sender needs to wait until timeout since
there are not enough duplicate ACKs (three are needed) to generate a lost-packet sig-
nal. Even if we retransmit the last packet multiple times to generate enough duplicate
ACKs to avoid timeout, as in Reactive TCP, the receiver will receive packet 9 0.9·RTT
later than Halfback and thus add 0.9 ·RTT to the FCT.
ROPR masks the latency penalty from packet loss but it also carries the cost of
additional packet retransmission with additional bandwidth consumption. However, as
we demonstrate in Fig. 1.2, TCP is too conservative for short flows and in §4.3.3 we
show that this additional bandwidth will not cause problems for the whole network and
co-existing flows.
4.3 Experiments
In this section, we conduct a performance evaluation of eight schemes to optimize short
flow latency: TCP, TCP-10 (set ICW to 10) [48, 25], TCP-Cache (caching older values
of the cwnd and ssthresh), JumpStart [75], PCP [28], Reactive TCP [53], Proactive
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Figure 4.3: The configuration of the experiments in Emulab
TCP [53], and finally Halfback. Our goal is to determine where these schemes lie in
the tradeoff space between latency and safety.
The experiments consist both flow-level benchmarks and application-level
benchmarks as listed below. For flow-level benchmarks, we first compare different
protocols’ latency performance with flow completion time (FCT) under different net-
work scenarios. And we evaluate the latency-safety trade-off with two metrics: TCP
friendliness and feasible network utilization, which we define as the maximum achiev-
able network utilization before the throughput collapses. To understand how the flow-
level benchmarks translate to application performance, we also evaluated application-
level benchmarks that measure the latency-safety trade-off with traffic patterns based
on real web sites.
4.3.1 Experiment Settings
Protocol Parameters: We use code from the PCP project directly [22]. For each of
the other mechanisms, we implemented the scheme within UDP-based Data Transfer
(UDT) [21] with Selective ACK. The segment size is 1500 bytes including the header.
The flow control window size advertised by the receiver is 141KB, the same as that
of Windows XP [48]. In our evaluation, we still use 2 segments as the default initial
window size for TCP protocols (except TCP-10). Note that although [48, 25] suggested
to set the ICW to 10 segments, it is not universally deployed.1 Halfback sets the Pacing
Threshold to the flow control window size.
Evaluation Environment: We test Halfback in both the wild Internet and controlled
emulation environments. In PlanetLab (§4.3.2.A), we randomly chose approximately
2.6K pairs among 100 hosts to act as senders and receivers. The locations of the nodes
include Asia, North America, Australia, Europe, and South America. The RTTs range
from 0.2ms to 400 ms. The flow size is 100KB. We also test Halfback with four home
networks (§4.3.2.B) from different providers (AT&T DSL with about 6Mbps down-
link connected to a home wireless router, Comcast with a wired 25Mbps downlink,
ConnectivityU with shared WiFi in a whole building and ConnectivityU with a wired
1We used the method of [7] to measure the ICW of the 10 most popular websites and found only four of
them increased their ICW, including one that set it as four segments.
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Figure 4.4: The number of normal TCP retransmissions of short flows in Planetlab exper-
iments
connection) in Champaign, Illinois. The clients are deployed behind home networks
and servers are on 170 PlanetLab nodes. The clients request short flows of 100KB size
from the servers. All other experiments are performed in Emulab, with the topology in
Fig. 4.3 emulating a single-bottleneck access network. We evaluated the performance
of Halfback with a wide range of realistic workloads and varying network parameters.
Unless otherwise stated, the router’s buffer size is the BDP between sender and re-
ceivers, 115 KB. For flow-level benchmarks in Emulab, unless otherwise stated, short
flows have size 100 KB and have exponential interarrival-time distribution.
4.3.2 Flow-level Benchmarks: Latency
A. Global Internet Evaluation on Planetlab
Fig. 4.5 is the CDF of the FCT of short flows in our PlanetLab evaluation across
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Figure 4.5: The flow completion time of short flows in Planetlab experiments
2.6K node pairs. The FCT includes both the data transmission time and connection
setup time. TCP has mean FCT of 1883 ms, with JumpStart significantly better at
905 ms and Halfback at 791 ms (13% reduction). Among the 2.6K experiments, 75%
of them have no packet loss during transmission and therefore, Halfback and Jump-
Start will have same FCT for those pairs. If we normalize the FCT by RTT (Fig. 4.6),
60% (not 75% due to RTT estimation inaccuracy) of the flows can be transmitted in 2
RTTs which is one third of TCP’s time. Halfback’s lower mean FCT than JumpStart
is because ROPR can handle packet loss better with proactive recovery and limited
aggressiveness to avoid timeout. Halfback’s 99th percentile FCT is 27.8% of TCP’s,
29.9% of TCP-10’s and 87.8% of JumpStart’s. To further understand Halfback’s per-
formance gain in the face of packet loss, Fig. 4.7 shows the CDF of FCT for the 25%
of cases where packet loss does happen. Halfback achieves a significant 193ms (21%)
reduction in median FCT compared to JumpStart.
We also measured the distribution of number of packet retransmissions in a flow
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Figure 4.6: The number of RTTs used in the transmission of short flows in Planetlab
experiments
(Fig. 4.4). In general, the network utilization is low in PlanetLab and therefore Jump-
Start and Halfback both achieve low packet loss in 90% of trials. At the same time, due
to their aggressive startup phase, they have relatively large 99th percentile packet loss.
This happens when the bandwidth of the bottleneck link is noticeably smaller than the
pacing rate in the aggressive startup phase and/or the bottleneck router buffer is small.
Note that Halfback runs normal TCP retransmission in parallel with ROPR; so ROPR
masks the latency penalty from loss but does not reduce the number of normal TCP
retransmissions.
B. Home Access Networks
PlanetLab nodes are mostly in research institutes and therefore, generally have
more access bandwidth than normal end-user access networks. To get some insight
into how Halfback performs under actual home access networks, we re-run the evalua-
tion of § 4.3.2.A with four clients behind four different home networks and 170 servers
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Figure 4.7: CDF of FCT under cases where packet loss happened
on PlanetLab nodes on Oct. 11th, 2015. We only compare the FCT of Halfback and
TCP in this experiment. Note that while we believe these experiments are representa-
tive of home connections, the several measurement locations should not be interpreted
as representative of the individual providers’ general performance.
Fig. 4.8 shows that in these real home networks, Halfback achieves significantly
improved FCT compared to TCP. Specifically, Halfback’s median FCT is 50%, 68%,
50% and 18% less than TCP’s in access networks provided by Comcast wired con-
nection, ConnectivityU wireless, ConnectivityU wired connection and AT&T wireless
respectively. We believe Halfback achieves less improvement in the AT&T network
because the evaluated network is of low bandwidth, but further detailed investigation
is needed. This experiment also does not include the effect of CDN caching, but it
demonstrates that Halfback improves short flows’ FCT in actual end-user networks.
Larger scale and more comprehensive evaluation will be left to future work.
D. Effect of Bufferbloat
Overly-large router buffers can be filled by TCP, producing bufferbloat, which in-
creases queuing delay and FCT of short flows. In this section, we evaluate the average
FCT for different router buffer sizes. From the results, we demonstrate that Halfback
consistently works well across small and large buffers. In this experiment, there is
one background TCP flow and multiple short flows sharing the bottleneck link. The
average interval between the short flows is 10 s. The whole experiment runs for 600 s.
Fig. 4.9(a) shows the resulting average FCT. Compared with the other schemes,
Halfback, JumpStart, TCP-cache and TCP-10 are less affected by bufferbloat as they
finish transmissions in fewer RTTs. Their average FCTs only increase ∼500 ms, while
TCP’s increases 1048 ms.
TCP-10, TCP-Cache, and JumpStart all begin sending quickly. As a result, when
router buffers are small (< 50KB) they experience significantly higher FCT than for
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Figure 4.8: CDF of FCT on home networks with different providers
their optimal buffer size. Halfback also begins sending quickly but ROPR helps it
recover from the resulting loss, achieving up to 45% lower FCT than JumpStart and
60% lower FCT than TCP-10 when the buffer is small.
PCP does not perform well when it co-exists with TCP. A PCP sender uses probing
to estimate the queue length on the end-to-end path. It will not send data, except
probing, when the queuing delay is increasing during the probing. But the competing
TCP senders keep building up the queue, so that PCP is actually more conservative
than the competing flows.
Fig. 4.9(b) shows the measured number of normal retransmissions, which equals
the total number of packet losses noticed by the receiver. Halfback only has 6 re-
transmitted packets on average which is 10.6% of JumpStart when the router buffers
are small. We focus on normal retransmissions here to demonstrate that Halfback can
effectively use proactive retransmission to protect it from using TCP’s normal retrans-
mission mechanism, which causes prolonged FCT. Halfback and JumpStart both have
packet loss due to their aggressive startup phase, but in JumpStart, the retransmitted
packets are sent at line rate which causes a large fraction of them to be lost again
and each lost packet may require multiple retransmissions. Since the sender needs
to wait until timeout when the retransmitted packets are lost, the loss of retransmis-
sion significantly increases the short flows’ FCT. Halfback’s ROPR sends proactively
retransmitted packets at the rate of ACKs received which approximates the available
bandwidth at the bottleneck link. Therefore, retransmitted packets are rarely lost again
and Halfback can, compared with JumpStart, have less retransmission overhead. PCP
has the smallest number of retransmission due to its conservative probing scheme.
D. Effect of Flow Size Distribution
The previous experiments all used fixed-size 100 KB flows. In this section, we eval-
uate FCT with flow size distribution drawn from measured distributions: a 10 Gbps
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Figure 4.9: The performance of short flows for different router buffer sizes
backbone link of a Tier-1 ISP [88], a 1500-node cluster in a Microsoft data center
network [59], and a private enterprise data center network [35]2. We truncate the dis-
tributions and set the maximum flow size to be 1 MB (as longer flows would use TCP).
The time interval between two flows is varied to achieve 25% network utilization.
We investigate FCT as a function of flow size, shown in Fig. 4.10. For flows of
a few tens of KB, TCP-Cache (and in a narrow region, TCP-10) achieves better per-
formance than Halfback, but after about 75 KB Halfback and JumpStart have the best
performance, achieving up to 313 ms lower latency than TCP and up to 233 ms lower
than TCP-10.
TCP-Cache has an unrealistic advantage here: the experiments use a sequence of
flows on an unchanging network topology (Fig. 4.3) with constant utilization and flow
size distribution. Real-world use of TCP-Cache, where senders encounter a diverse
2Original data sets were not available; the distributions here were approximated from figures in the pub-
lications.
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Figure 4.10: Flow completion time for different flow size under 25% network utilization
for different network traffic distributions
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range of receivers across the public Internet and network conditions change, would
have poorer estimates of the correct rate. A large-scale characterization of TCP-Cache
performance would require logs of server/client interactions across time and is outside
the scope of this study (and is an interesting area for future work).
But why does TCP-Cache outperform Halfback? Halfback sends at a high rate;
however it paces its data over one RTT, which can delay FCT for very small flows.
Indeed, Fig. 4.10 shows that TCP-Cache outperforms Halfback in a very small range
of small flow size. An easy refinement of Halfback would be to send a first batch of
data as a burst (either 10 segments as in TCP-10 or a historically-sized window as in
TCP-Cache) before Halfback’s Pacing Phase.
4.3.3 Flow-level Benchmarks: Latency-Safety Trade-off
Mechanisms with aggressive initial startup phase come with overhead that may be
problematic and in extreme cases could cause performance collapse. We need to ensure
that a mechanism chosen for short flows is safe, in the sense that potential performance
degradation is limited. In this section we measure the effects when aggressive short
flows compete with (1) each other, (2) long TCP flows, (3) short TCP flows, and (4)
the transient disruption effect on ongoing flows. The results indicate that the aggres-
sive startup phase used by both JumpStart and Halfback can increase aggressiveness,
but Halfback’s ROPR phase significantly mitigates this problem.
A. Short Aggressive vs. Short Aggressive
We begin with the most demanding environment: aggressive short flows competing
with each other under high utilization. All flows run the same protocol, so there is no
issue of TCP-friendliness, but all flows are short and hence all incur overhead to achieve
low latency. This is a pessimistic scenario, because as noted in [4], most Internet
flows are long video streaming flows and therefore, even in a highly utilized edge
network, the extra load incurred by more aggressive short flows will be much smaller
than the scenario evaluated here. We evaluate Halfback in this challenging network
condition because we believe rate control protocols should be reasonably robust to
unusual scenarios in addition to performing well in the common case.
The flows are all 100 KB, and we vary average network utilization (transient uti-
lization can be higher) from 5% to 90% in 5% increments. The key question is to what
feasible capacity we can push utilization before performance collapse, with a spike in
packet loss and FCT.
The results (Fig. 4.11) show that TCP, TCP-10, TCP-Cache, and Reactive have
feasible capacity of 85% to 90% utilization. Due to its proactive retransmission that
doubles bytes transmitted, Proactive TCP has performance collapse at 45% network
utilization. JumpStart performs slightly better, with feasible capacity of 50%. Halfback
improves this significantly to 70%, similar to PCP but with dramatically better FCT
than PCP.
B. Short Aggressive vs. Long TCP
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Figure 4.11: The performance of different mechanisms for different network utilizations
while there are only short flows
In this experiment, 10% of the traffic is generated by short flows and 90% is gen-
erated by 100 MB long flows. We vary the short flows’ rate control mechanism, but
the long flows always run TCP. We vary the average interval between flows to achieve
different network utilizations, from 30% to 85%. For lower-variance comparisons, all
the experiments for different schemes use the same schedule of flow arrivals for each
network utilization.
Fig. 4.12 shows the average FCT of short flows and long flows, normalized by their
FCTs under a baseline scenario where the short flows run TCP.
For short flows, compared with TCP, Halfback achieves around 56% lower FCT,
JumpStart is 51% lower and TCP-10 is 29% lower. Proactive TCP experiences a small
increase in FCT as its proactive retransmission increases the queuing delay and causes
additional packet loss. For long flows, Proactive TCP increases their FCT up to 25%
due to its whole-flow proactive retransmission and JumpStart increases it about 10%
because of the aggressive startup phase and its propensity to retransmit the same pack-
ets multiple times. Halfback only slows long flows by 3% as in its ROPR phase, the
retransmission rate approximates the available bandwidth and avoids affecting other
flows.
C. Short Aggressive vs. Short TCP
In this experiment, half of the flows employ a non-TCP mechanism and the others
use TCP. In each scenario, we pick one non-TCP protocol and one network utilization
(ranging from 5% to 30% in steps of 5%). Figure 4.13 shows the results as a scatter
plot, where each point is a particular protocol at a particular utilization. The x-axis is
the average FCT of TCP flows in that scenario, divided by the average FCT if all flows
run TCP; the y-axis is the average FCT of the non-TCP flows in that scenario, divided
by the average FCT if all flows run the non-TCP protocol. In other words, we measure
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Figure 4.12: Flow Completion Time normalized by the Flow Completion Time of TCP for
different network utilizations with 10% of traffic created by short flows and 90% by long
flows
the factor change in FCT for each kind of flow due to co-existence.
The results show that Halfback, TCP-10, TCP-Cache and Reactive TCP are TCP-
friendly as their results are located near (1, 1) where the FCTs of TCP flows and non-
TCP flows are not affected due to multi-protocol deployment. Halfback has an aggres-
sive startup phase, but as its FCT is small, it leaves more space for TCP flows after its
transmission.
JumpStart and Proactive TCP are somewhat non-TCP-friendly. JumpStart, due to
its aggressive startup and propensity to retransmit the same packets multiple times, in-
creases the co-existing TCP flows’ FCT. Proactive has high overhead from retransmit-
ting every packet. Because PCP’s probing can only succeed when the TCP flows stop
sending new data, as we explained in §4.3.2.C, its FCT is increased while co-existing
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Figure 4.13: TCP-friendliness of different non-TCP mechanisms
with TCP.
D. Effect on Throughput of Ongoing Flows
For an important class of real-time applications, like video conferencing and online
gaming, throughput is very important. Aggressive mechanisms for low latency may,
unfortunately, affect the background flows’ throughput. In this evaluation, we run a
background TCP flow and after achieving full bandwidth, start a short flow with Half-
back or TCP. We count the number of successfully transmitted packets in every 60 ms
and calculate each flow’s throughput. The results are shown in Fig. 4.14.
Ideally, we would like the throughput of the background flow and short flow to be
like Fig. 4.14(a) in the sense that TCP recovers quickly and short flows finish trans-
mission fast. When we employ Halfback for the short flows (Fig. 4.14(b)), as the
background flow employs TCP whose AIMD congestion control needs a long time
to recover from sending rate reduction after packet loss, the sender needs 180ms to
achieve half bandwidth and around 2s, 1s longer than that when we employ TCP for
short flows (Fig. 4.14(c)), to achieve full bandwidth.
However, this effect of throughput is mitigated by several facts. First, the back-
ground flow can quickly achieve half its former bandwidth, and could recover even
more quickly with a protocol like PCC [47]. Second, and most importantly, the same
effect can be caused by short TCP flows. In the current Internet, to achieve lower la-
tency, many applications separate their data into multiple parts and start several TCP
connections simultaneously. We evaluate how two TCP flows each with half the flow
size may affect the background flow (Fig. 4.14(d)). In this case, it needs about 2.7s to
recover full bandwidth and the short flows still have longer FCT than Halfback.
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Figure 4.14: Throughput of flows for (a) Optimal situation (b) Halfback (c) One TCP (d)
Two TCP flows with half flow size
4.3.4 Application-level Benchmark: Webpage Response Time
In the previous sections, we compared different approaches in terms of flow-level
benchmarks including latency performance and latency-safety trade-off. However, the
flow-level benchmarks do not directly translate to application-level performance. To
better understand the connection of flow-level benchmarks to application performance,
we evaluate a realistic scenario where a client randomly requests the front page of one
of the 100 most popular web sites [20] including all objects. The server will send all
the objects of this website in the same order as when the client uses the Chrome web
browser. We vary the inter-arrival time between two web requests to control the net-
work utilization. In this experiment, we measure the average web request response
time (delivering all objects) at different network utilizations for different protocols.
As shown in Fig 4.15, JumpStart’s response time becomes larger than TCP and is
592ms (27%) larger than Halfback at only 30% utilization. Even for lower utilizations,
the ordering between protocols changes compared to flow-level results: JumpStart is
now worse than TCP-10. Overall, Halfback achieves much better latency-safety trade-
off at the application level for web browsing. This unexpected result is because of
the concurrent connections that web browsers usually start simultaneously which can
cause transient high network utilization. JumpStart will incur high packet loss and
cannot recover quickly.
Halfback is also affected by the concurrent connection effect. The response time
becomes slower than TCP at 55% of network utilization, which is smaller than the flow-
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Figure 4.15: Average response time for different mechanisms under different network
utilization
Startup phase Lost packet recoveryAdditional
bandwidth
Retransmission
direction
Retransm-
ission rate
Slow Start
2-segment
initial cwnd 0% Originalordering Pacing10-segment
initial cwnd 50% Reverse-
ordering
Line
ratePacing Pacing wholeflow in one RTT 100%
Table 4.1: Different kinds of startup phase and lost packet recovery schemes.
level benchmark result in §4.3.3.A. However, since the average network utilization is
only 20% to 30% [55], and this experiment is a pessimistic case in which all utilization
is from relatively short web flows (rather than movie downloads), it is safe to deploy
Halfback into the Internet. On the other hand, JumpStart’s application-level results are
unsatisfying. In sum, compared to JumpStart, Halfback improves significantly in both
latency and safety at the application level.
4.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss and evaluate in detail why Halfback’s ROPR phase con-
tributes to its better performance over other schemes.
In Table ??, we list several different schemes that can be used for initial start-
up phase and packet loss recovery phase. For short flows, choosing initial start-up
mechanism is important but relatively simple: it has to be more aggressive than TCP’s
conservative approach. As shown in Fig. 4.16, when the network utilization is small,
pacing all data out at one RTT (as in JumpStart) achieves the smallest FCT which is
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80.1% of TCP-10’s and 50.8% of TCP’s. However, using only this aggressive startup
phase will cause performance to collapse at 50% network utilization which is much
smaller than TCP-10’s (85%) and TCP’s (90%) feasible capacity. This is because the
normal TCP retransmission scheme cannot quickly recover the lost packets and is still
too aggressive itself by bursting out all lost packets with high possibility to incur more
packet loss.
Therefore, a good design of proactive packet retransmission mechanism is needed.
The key questions then are what design decisions to make in terms of additional band-
width used, order of retransmission and retransmission rate. Halfback proactively uses
50% additional capacity, reverse-ordered transmission and retransmission rate that is
clocked by the receiving ACKs. In the following, we will experimentally show that
these are good design decisions for Halfback.
Additional bandwidth: We choose Proactive TCP (100% additional bandwidth used)
and TCP (0% additional bandwidth used) to see how additional bandwidth used may
affect the feasible capacity. Both mechanisms have the same startup phase and retrans-
mission rate and direction. As shown in Fig. 4.16, Proactive TCP’s feasible capacity
is only 4˜5% and that of TCP is 90%. Therefore, excessive bandwidth overhead can
cause severe safety problems. But without additional bandwidth, just like JumpStart
and TCP, the mechanisms cannot achieve good enough latency performance. In our
design, we try to efficiently use limited (50%) additional bandwidth to achieve small
FCT with relatively large feasible capacity. It is also possible to dynamically tune the
additional bandwidth used for proactive retransmission according to the history of net-
work conditions (e.g. instead of sending one retransmission for each ACK, we could
send two retransmissions for every three ACKs). The tradeoff of that scheme is an
interesting open question for future research.
Retransmission direction: Here we test a new scheme, Halfback-forward. Halfback-
forward and Halfback both use pacing startup, 50% additional bandwidth in proactive
retransmission at same rate. The only difference is that Halfback-forward proactively
retransmits packets in forward order instead of reverse order. The feasible capacity of
Halfback-forward falls to 35% comparing to Halfback’s 70%. This is because first
half of the flow is much less likely to have packet loss than second half of the flow.
Therefore, the additional proactive transmission is effectively wasted and simply adds
unnecessary utilization on top of normal retransmission.
Retransmission rate: To choose the proactive retransmission rate, we test Halfback
and another new scheme, Halfback-burst. The only difference between these two mech-
anisms is Halfback proactively retransmits at a rate matching received ACKs, while
Halfback-burst uses line rate for retransmission. Halfback-burst’s feasible capacity is
significantly smaller than that of Halfback since line rate is much larger than the avail-
able bandwidth of the bottleneck link. This causes many retransmitted packets to be
lost and wastes the bandwidth used in proactive retransmission.
In sum, Halfback’s ROPR does make good design decisions with proactive, reverse-
ordered and pacing-based retransmission. Without any one of them, ROPR, and thus
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Figure 4.16: FCT and feasible capacity of mechanisms with different startup phases and
lost packet recovery mechanisms.
Halfback, will not work effectively. Finding an even better trade-off is conceivably
possible and would be an interesting area of future work.
52
Chapter 5
Quantifying Router-level Path
Inflation in the Internet across
Years
5.1 Causes of Path Inflation
The distance between the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and San Jose is
around 2.92 × 103 km which means that Direct Optical Fiber (DOF) latency, the time
spent by light on the geographical direct fiber between these two cities, is around 14.6
ms (2.92 × 103km/(2 × 108)m/s1). However, based on our measurement, the one-
way latency between these two positions is able to be as high as 37.95 ms, 2.6 times
the ideal one-way latency.
This kind of latency inflation can be caused by many factor. For example, the design
of the network topology is able to increase the inflation due to its lack of directed links.
Routing protocols may also cause the path inflation since the shortest path may not
be chosen to carry the traffic. In this section, we try to quantify the path inflation in
router-level to better understand how much improvement we are able to achieve when
we design new protocols or future networks.
In the following sections in this chapter, we define the path inflation as the rate for
the sum of the distance between two adjacent routers on the end-to-end path over the
length of the DOF between these two hosts. It is different from the latency inflation,
which is equal to the one-way latency between the two hosts measured by Ping over
the time spent by light on the DOF.
5.1.1 Dataset
To analyze the causes of inflation in router-level, we need the following data:
Internet topology: This data is used to identify whether there exists a direct link be-
tween two routers or not. In our analysis, we use the data from CAIDA in December
2014 [19]. This dataset is collected by traceroute from 94 Ark monitors located in 36
countries, which includes 64.6 million nodes. To scale down the analysis, we combine
all the nodes of one ISP in the same city as one Point of Presence (POP) [101]. After
this combination, there are 250,590 POPs in our dataset.
Real route information: The latency inflation between two hosts can be affected by
many factors, e.g. the co-existing traffic, which makes this inflation varied across
time [107]. To make the problem simple, instead of analyzing the fluxible latency
1The speed of light in fiber is around 1.5 times of that in vacuum
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inflation, in this work we try to figure out the causes of path inflation which equals the
distance of the end-to-end path over the distance between two hosts. In this case, we
need the real route information between the two hosts which is able to be collected by
traceroute.
IP geolocation: Since we need to calculate the sum of the distance between each of
two adjacent routers, we need the geolocation for all the devices included. However,
this kind of information is not open to all people for various reasons, such as business
competition and security problems. For example, when the attacker has the geolocation
information for some important routers, they are able to cause havoc to the whole
network by breaking down this important infrastructure facilities.
However, since the geolocation information is very useful for many applications,
e.g. CDN, there are many projects try to get a relatively accurate geolocation for the
routers [110, 85, 60]. In section 5.2 we will demonstrate how different IP geolocation
databases may affect the result of the path inflation. In this section, we use the data
collected in December 2014 by IPligence [11], which started to provide geolocation
service in 2008. The IP geolocation in this database is around 93.9% [97] accurate
when compared with CAIDA’s ground truth database [67], which includes the real
geographic location of a small number of routers.
AS relationship: In this section, we also want to figure out how valley-free and prefer-
customer policies increase the path inflation and to compare these results with the to-
tal inflation caused by inter-domain routing protocols. To achieve this, we need the
customer-provider relationship between each of two ASes to calculate the shortest path
with the corresponding policies. In this section, we use the AS relationship collected
by CAIDA in 2014 [18].
5.1.2 Inflation Contributors
In the following analysis, we quantify the inflation contributors into two categories:
network topology and routing protocols. For network topology, we consider the infla-
tion caused by lack of direct links. For routing protocols, we separate them into three
parts: intra-domain routing protocols (used to select the path within one ISP), inter-
domain routing protocols (used to select the sequence of ISPs for the end-to-end path)
and peering policies (used to select the path between two ISPs).
Network topology: It is impossible to have direct links between any two hosts since
we cannot have so many routers and fibers. Therefore, for the source and destination
hosts, they need to jump multi-hops to reach each other, especially when both of them
are located in small cities. We define the inflation caused by this reason as topology
inflation.
Inter-domain routing protocols: Currently, the Internet uses Border Gateway Pro-
tocol (BGP) [91, 103] as the inter-domain routing protocol, which allows the Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes) to propagate routing information and choose AS routes. In
this paper, we analyze the path inflation caused by two typical BGP routing policies,
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Figure 5.1: The path inflation caused by different reasons in 2014 December based on the
geolocation information provided by IPLG.
valley-free and prefer-customer [56, 26, 69]. In addition, since the Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) may also evolve some other policies to choose the inter-domain route,
we also use the AS path of the real route collected by traceroute to analyze the total
path inflation caused by inter-domain routing protocols.
Peering policies: In one AS, the routers that know how to forward packets from
current AS to the next AS hop are gateway routers. Peering policies are used to choose
the in-/out-gateway routers when the packet is forwarded from one AS to the other
AS. There are many peering policies, such as early-exit, late-exit, and best-exit. In
this analysis, we use the same gateway routers found by the real route to figure out the
inflation caused by peering policies.
Intra-domain routing protocols: There are many intra-domain routing protocols,
such OSPF [80], RIP [68], static routing [63], and so on. Different ASes may have
their own intra-domain routing policy, which increases the difficulty of analyzing the
inflation caused by intra-domain routing protocols. Some previous works [101, 106]
try to create their own model to simulate the routing process in one ISP. However, this
kind of simulation causes inaccuracy for the analysis of intra-domain routing policy
inflation. In our work, instead of directly figuring out the intra-domain inflation, we
use the indirect way (reducing all the other inflations, device-lacking, peering and inter-
domain routing inflations from the total inflation) for our calculation.
5.1.3 Inflation for Different Contributors
Figure 5.1 demonstrates the inflation contributed in December 2014 by the four factors
in Section 5.1.2. We use the DOF distance as the baseline. The inflation caused
by different contributors equals the distance of the shortest path with corresponding
policies over the distance of DOF. Below is how we calculate the inflations in the
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figure.
• A. Topology (Top.) inflation is the distance of the shortest path in the current
Internet topology over DOF distance.
• B. Topology and valley-free (VF) inflation is the distance of the shortest path in
which there is no AS providing transit services between any two of its providers
or peers over the length of DOF.
• C. Topology, valley-free, and prefer-customer (PC) inflation is the distance of the
shortest path with valley-free and prefer-customer policies over DOF distance.
In addition to valley-free, prefer-customer policy requires the ASes to choose the
route from customer AS instead of from peering or provider AS, even if the latter
is shorter.
• D. Topology and observed AS path (ASP) inflation is the distance of the shortest
path which visits the same sequence of ISPs of the end-to-end path collected
from traceroute over the length of DOF. This inflation is slightly different from
C since some ISPs may not conform to Gao-Rexford [56] policies.
• E. Topology, AS path, and peering inflation is the distance of the shortest path
with the same AS route and peering links (the links connecting two nodes in
different ASes) of the end-to-end path over the DOF distance.
• F. Observed traceroute inflation is the distance of the route collected by tracer-
oute over the length of DOF.
According to the results, physical contributors, e.g. lack of routers or direct fibers,
increase the path inflation by 0.82% in the median and by 18.73% at the 90th percentile.
This result shows that for the current Internet topology we are able to achieve the end-
to-end latency very close to the time spent by light on the DOF.
The total inflation caused by inter-domain (the difference between A and D) routing
protocols is nearly the same as the total inflation caused by prefer-customer (the differ-
ence between A and B) and valley-free policies (the difference between A and C). In
the results, the median of valley-free inflation is 1.077 and the 90th percentile is 2.251.
Compared with prefer-customer policy whose median inflation is 1.105, the inflation
caused by valley-free policy is slightly small. This is because there are more routes
satisfied with valley-free than with prefer-customer, so it is easier to find a relatively
shorter path in these routes for valley-free than for prefer-customer.
Peering inflation (the difference between E and D) is the main component of the
total path inflation. Based on our results, the inflation increased by peering policies is
around 62.20% at the median and 289.70% at the 90th percentile, which is much larger
than AS path inflation and the inflation caused by intra-domain routing protocols. It is
more difficult to reduce the inflation caused by peering policies than it is to reduce that
caused by intra-domain routing policies or even inter-domain routing protocols since
achieving small peering inflation sometimes may require that the current ISPs have
some global information for the end-to-end path.
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Intra-domain routing protocols (the difference between F and E) only increase the
path inflation by 29.04% at the median and 58.48% at the 90th percentile, which is
small compared with the inflation caused by inter-domain routing protocols and peer-
ing policies. This is because it is easier to achieve the shortest path while there is only
one ISP involved. Due to using the smallest number of hops path instead of the short-
est distance path as the main component of intra-domain routing protocols and traffic
engineering there are still small amounts of inflation caused by intra-domain routing
protocols.
Based on this result, 0.72% of the total path inflation is caused by network topology;
18.82% of the total path inflation is contributed by inter-domain routing protocols;
54.85% of that is caused by peering policies; and the rest, 25.6%, is contributed by
intra-domain routing protocols. We are able to find that the main component of the
inflation is caused by peering policies.
5.2 Geolocation Validation
In this section, we demonstrate how different databases of routers’ geolocation infor-
mation affect the result of total path inflation. To achieve this goal, we use the same
database as in Section 5.1 for the Internet topology, the AS relationship and real Inter-
net routes between some hosts. Except these, we use different databases for devices
geolocation to compute the total path inflation between hosts based on the real route in
the Internet.
5.2.1 Databases
In this section, we use following geolocation databases:
MaxMind [13] was founded in 2002 to provide the geolocation service for a range
of databases, from country level to city level. In this section, we use three databases
from MaxMind: MaxMind GeoLite City (MML), MaxMind GeoLit2 City (MML2)
and MaxMind Geo City (MM). GeoLite City and GeoLite2 City are free and updated
every month. According to their own data, the accuracy of GeoLit2 is 67% in the
United States, determined by checking with some known IP address and location pairs.
Geo City is a commercial database which has higher accuracy and larger coverage than
GeoLite City and GeoLite2 City. Based on their own data, Geo City covers more than
99.99% of the IP addresses in use and is 81% accurate for cities in the United States
within a 50 km radius.
DBIP [5] is one of the most comprehensive and accurate IP address databases. It owns
more than 8 million iPv4 and IPv6 blocks. However, most of their blocks are in the
United States, around 47.7%, which may reduce its accuracy for global analysis. DBIP
updates its database every month and hundreds of thousands of blocks are added; for
example, 755K blocks were added in November 2015.
IP2Location (IP2L) [10] is developed and maintained by Hexasoft. In addition to
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Figure 5.2: The traceroute inflation calculated by different geolocation databases.
the device’s geolocation, it also provides some other information, such as the ISP and
network bandwidth, based on the IP address. The accuracy of IP2Location is 76.31%
for cities in the United States, which is a little bit lower than that of MaxMind Geo
City. They argue that this inaccuracy is due to the dynamic IP allocation of some large
ISPs, such as AOL and MSN TV. This is especially true for AOL, which uses a network
to route all its traffic through Reston, Virginia, which makes the geolocation services
unable to determine the location of people who dial into the AOL network.
IPligence (IPLG) [11] has been providing geolocation service since 2006. It has
93.9% accuracy when compared with the ground truth database from CAIDA [97].
This database [67] contains the geolocation information for a small number of routers
from a private database for a tier-1 ISP and a tier-2 ISP and the public database for
CANET [3], GEANT [6], Internet2 [9], I-Light [8], and National LambdaRail [14].
EdgeScape (ES) [2] is provided by Akamai, which primarily provides a content de-
livery network service. Since CDN service needs to identify customers’ geolocation
based on their IP addresses which are naturally fit for geolocation service, they added
the geolocation service EdgeScape in 2001. Considering its worldwide scope and inte-
gration with networks, its accuracy of IP geolocation information may be higher than
the other databases.
5.2.2 Inflation for Different Geolocation Databases
Fig.5.2 demonstrates the traceroute inflation for around 1.9 million pairs of hosts for
each database. In this result, we are able to find that the traceroute inflations are sim-
ilar to each other, except that of DBIP and MML, which are slightly different. This is
because for the hosts with inaccurate geolocations, their geolocations will not be far
away from the correct ones. However, this difference may be smaller than the differ-
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Figure 5.3: The path inflation caused by different reasons in 2014 December based on the
geolocation information provided by MML.
ence when we compare the databases with the ground truth database which has the real
geolocation of the routers. This is because it is easy for the geo-location databases to
make the same mistake; for example, both IP2Location and IPligence identify some
hosts in Canada to the United States. Currently, we do not have enough ground truth
data for IP mapping to generate the accurate traceroute inflation.
Among all the databases we are able to access, we choose two representative ones,
MML and IPLG, and compare path inflation caused by the factors mentioned in §5.1.2
based on these two geolocation databases. We find out that even through the data of
the path inflations are different, we are still able to get the same conclusions as §5.1.
The AS path inflation is still equal to the sum of the path inflation caused by valley-
free and prefer-customer. Besides this, the main component of the total path inflation
is still peering inflation. Moreover, valley-free inflation is still slightly smaller than
prefer-customer inflation.
5.3 Path Inflation across the Years
Path inflation was first noticed around a decade ago. Since then, a lot of researchers
have been paying attention to it. They try to quantify the causes of this phenomenon in
different directions and hope it can be reduced in future work. In this section, we want
to figure out how the inflation changed since people started paying so much attention to
it. The result demonstrates that the inflation caused by different contributors is reduced
by around 24.22% in total for the past five years.
In this section, we use the same data sets as in Section 5.1 for each year, except for
the geolocation information. Since most databases only provide routers’ geolocation
information for the current Internet, in this section we use MaxMind LiteGeo City as
the resource of geolocation, which is stored by CAIDA, from July 2010 to December
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2014. Even through the result of total path inflation calculated from MML is slightly
different from the other geolocation databases, since we only care about the trend of
path inflation changed and we use the same database for geolocation information, using
MML as resource of geolocation does not affect our results.
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Figure 5.4: The path inflation caused by different characters for past five years.
Fig.5.4 demonstrates the median and 90th percentile results of the path inflation
caused by the following: network topology, valley-free routing policy, prefer-customer
routing policy, inter-domain routing protocols, peering policies, and intra-domain rout-
ing protocols. According to our results, we are able to find that the inflation caused by
each factor is reduced every year, especially from 2011 to 2012. For the total inflation,
it is reduced by 2.2% from 2010 to 2011, 10% from 2011 to 2012, 6% from 2012 to
2013, and 8% from 2013 to 2014. Besides this, the rate between the inflation caused by
intra-domain routing protocols and that caused by inter-domain routing protocols have
been relatively stable for these five years. However, the rate between that of peering
policies and inter-domain routing protocols has been reduced from 1.25 to 1.08, which
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means that people notice the relatively high inflation caused by peering policies, and,
compared with inter-domain routing protocols, they pay more attention to reduce the
inflation caused by peering policies.
5.4 Suggestions to Reduce Path Inflation
We do not suggest directly using the shortest-path routing in AS-level or as intra-
domain routing protocol due to the scalability and safety problems. It has been demon-
strated [24] that when shortest-path routing is used in the network, the maximum con-
gestion will scale poorly. In addition, shortest-path routing will cause hot-spot links,
and the failure of any of these links will cause a catastrophe for the whole network.
In this section, we introduce some approaches to reduce the end-to-end inflation.
These approaches are able to be used in the Internet with no dependency on the net-
work topology. Most of them can always be used no matter what kinds of AS level
routing protocols are used by the Internet and what kinds of weighted shortest path
intra-domain routing protocols are used by ISPs. This gives the flexibility to the net-
works when they choose their own routing protocols to avoid hot-spot links and in-
crease their scalability.
5.4.1 Last AS Hop Relationship
In the real routes collected from traceroute, we find this phenomenon: A  B  
C  D, where A and D are in the same city and there exists direct link between A
and D. This kind of route increases the number of hops and sometimes also increases
the total inflation when B and C are not in the city of A and D. Most of the time,
this phenomenon happens at the end of the route and D usually is the destination host.
After finding out the ISP to which these nodes belong, we find these hops existed just
because A and D are not in the same ISP, and the route needs to jump to gateway B to
swap to the ISP of the destination node.
Due to this phenomenon, we suggest that the routers in the same city of the destina-
tion host be treated as the routers in the sibling ISP of the destination host. In this case,
when the route reaches the city of the final destination, it is able to directly jump to the
destination host if the router owns the link to the host. Fig.5.5 shows that the number
of hops and inflation are reduced by this mechanism when this phenomenon occurs.
According to the results, we are able to find that this mechanism may not reduce much
inflation (Fig. 5.5.a) since usually this kind of detour will choose the gateway nodes
nearly the destination. However, if we consider the number of hops (Fig. 5.5.b) re-
duced, this mechanism helps a lot: 17.8% in the median. As we know, transmission
latency, which monotonically increase with the number of hops is usually larger than
propagation latency which is monotonically increasing with the total length of fibers,
so even this mechanism cannot reduce much path inflation, but it is able to reduce much
latency inflation caused by the last few jumps.
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Figure 5.5: The distance and number of hops reduced by sibling relationship for the
routers in the destination city.
5.4.2 Intra-domain Routing Policy
Most ISPs use weighted shortest path as their intra-domain routing protocols. The
weight of each link is assigned based on multiple characters. For example, when
providers decide the weight, they may consider the bandwidth and the amount of traf-
fic to go through to avoid congestion. The primary factor of the weight usually is the
number of hops. There are many reasons make the providers use the number of hops
instead of the length of the link as the primary factor. First, the transmission delay is
usually larger than the propagation delay, so the path with the smaller number of hops
and longer total length of fibers is able to have relatively small latency inflation (the
rate for the real end-to-end latency over the time for light spent on the DOF between
the source and destination hosts). In addition, the route with the smaller number of
hops causes the smaller total amount of workload for the routers on the end-to-end
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path. Finally, using number of hops as the primary character is easier to be deployed
compared with length of links. Due to the reasons, even though using the number of
hops as the primary factor of weight may increase the path inflation, most providers
still chose it as their intra-domain routing protocol.
However, we argue that the length of links is also an important factor. According
to the analysis in Section 5.1, we are able to find that using link length is able to
reduce the total path inflation up to 29.04% in the median which is around 25.6%
of the total inflation. Besides this, the configuration of a newly added router is not
complex. The only additional work is calculating the length of the link while setting
up the connections between this newly added router and the others. Compared with
the number of hops, the length of links needs to reconfiguration when the location of
the router is changed. However, if the router is moved in a small area, e.g. in one
building or in one city, it is not necessary to reconfigure the weight of the link due to
the small change of the length and the long distance moving of the routers usually is
not common. Considering these reasons, we suggest the providers use the length of
links as a factor of the weight for links–for example, using the total length of the route
to break the tie for the routes with the same number of hops–to reduce the path inflation
caused by intra-domain routing protocols.
5.4.3 Peering Policy
The inflation caused by peering policies is around 54.85%, which is the largest one
among all the factors. Reducing this kind of inflation is very difficult due to the ISPs’
lower degree of cooperation. The peering policies are able to be separated into three
categories. The first one is early-exit or hot potato peering policies in which the current
ISP will forward the packet to the next AS hop as soon as possible. The second one is
late-exit peering policies, for this peering policy, the current ISP will choose the come-
out gateway router which is closest to the destination host as the peering node. Late-
exit peering policy requests the gateway routers with large memory since the come-
out gateway router depends on the prefix of the destination host. The last category is
peering policies, which is in the middle of these two.
Fig.5.6 shows the distance of the first and second AS hop, normalized by the DOF
distance, for the route with two AS hops. Based on this result, we are able to find that
there exists a primary AS hop which contributes nearly all the distance between the
source and destination hosts. For the optimal route, i.e., the shortest path with the same
AS path for the real route, most have the primary AS hop in the first AS hop. The
result of traceroute is closer to the optimal situation. For the early-exit peering policy,
the primary AS hop slightly prefers to be the second one. This result demonstrates that
in the current Internet, most ISPs do not always use early-exit peering policies; instead,
their choice is closer to the optimal ones.
Fig.5.7 demonstrates the location of the primary AS hop for the optimal route (the
shortest path for this AS route) with the number of AS hops from 2 to 6. With this
result, we are able to figure out that the primary AS hop is usually in the middle of the
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Figure 5.6: The first and last AS hop’s path inflation caused by different peering policies
for routes with two As hops.
AS routes and the size of these ISPs are relatively large. Since large ISPs usually have
more direct links, especially for the links which cross countries or continents, they are
a good candidate for the primary AS hops. Besides this, the ISPs with many prefixes
are usually small, compared with the tier-1 or tier-2 ISP, so the first and last few ASes
on the end-to-end path are relatively small, which means the ASes with primary AS
hop are always in the middle of the AS routes. In this case, the source node needs to
jump a few AS hops to the large ISP, which is the AS of the primary AS hop, and then
jump back to the AS of the destination nodes.
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Figure 5.7: The path inflation caused by optimal peering policy.
According to previous results, we suggest the AS choose the peering policy based
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on its own size. If the size of the ISP is large, the ISP should choose its peering policy to
be late-exit or the peering policies closer to late-exit to make itself the primary AS hop.
If the size of the ISP is small, then the ISP should choose its peering policy as early-
exit or the peering policies closer to early-exit and forward the packet to the ISP of the
primary AS hop as soon as possible. This mechanism is able to save some inflation
caused by the small ISP; it also moves some inflation caused by peering policies to that
caused by the large ISP’s intra-domain routing protocols, which is easier to be reduced.
For deployment, this mechanism does not need any cooperation between the ISPs. In
addition, the gateway routers in the large ISP usually are able to handle the workload
of the late-exit due to their large memory and fast computing speed.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Short flows are widely used and highly valuable in the modern Internet as lots of ap-
plications use them, such as in the form of web requests, to make interaction with the
users. This kind of flow is sensitive to user-perceived latency and a small additional
delay is able to cause the loss of customer attention and revenue.
In the past a few decades, a lot of works have tries to analyze the causes of latency
and to reduce it for short flows in different directions [79, 53, 72], such as reducing
connection establishment time, fast recovering packet loss, saving time spent on TCP’s
slow start and so on. In this work, we try to reduce the flow completion time of the
short flows as close as possible to one RTT. Besides this, we also intend to break down
the latency inflation on the end-to-end path into its contribution factors and hope to
inform future research on latency reduction for short flows.
6.1 Thesis Achievements
Below are the achievements of this work:
• We design ASAP, a new low-latency transport protocol for wide-area networks.
ASAP revisits classic Internet design decisions by modifying and merging func-
tionality of DNS and TCP to substantially reduce connection establishment de-
lay, benefiting interactive communications such as web browsing.
• We evaluate transport-layer performance of ASAP which includes downloading
time of individual files, computational overhead, and vulnerability of DoS at-
tacks. According to our evaluation, ASAP is able to save around 100 to 200 ms
for downloading a file with size from 1KB to 500KB. The computational time for
PVs, servers, and DNS servers is smaller than 1 ms and that for client is around
1 to 2 ms. Besides this, we also demonstrate that two PVs with random locations
are sufficient to make the ASAP less vulnerable than TCP in 75% cases.
• We experimentally compare existing solutions for reducing data transmission
latency and, more importantly, the trade-off between latency and safety at both
the flow level and the application level. We argue that existing solutions are still
operating away from the sweet spot on this trade-off plane.
• We designed Halfback, a new aggressive transport scheme for short flows, based
on the diagnosis of existing solutions. Halfback substantially reduces transmis-
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sion delay and achieves high sending rate quickly. In addition, with the help of
Reverse-Ordered Predictive Retransmission, Halfback works well for challeng-
ing situations, like high utilization networks, with limited effect on competing
TCP flows. Finally, as Halfback only requires changes in the sender and is TCP-
friendly, it is feasible to deploy into the current Internet.
• We also quantify the router-level path inflation on a large scale across five years.
According to our result, the main component of the path inflation is caused by
peering policy even though the proportion of it has been reduced in the past a
few years. Besides this, the total path inflation has been reduced around 22%
since 2010.
• In addition to providing analysis, we also give some suggestions: 1) consider
routers in the destination city as with sibling relationship of destination host;
2) choose peering policies based on ISP size; and 3) consider total fiber length
in intra-domain routing policies to reduce the path inflation or latency inflation
caused by peering, inter-domain, and intra-domain routing policies. These sug-
gestions only require small changes for the corresponding policies and are easy
to be deployed into the current Internet.
6.2 Future Work
The necessity to reduce the flow completion time of short flows will never end. Here
we discuss several of the most interesting and challenging research directions that we
still have to solve for this topic.
Evaluating application-level performance of ASAP for downloading a multi-
object web page: Downloading a multi-object web page may compound ASAP’s ben-
efit (because the browser often needs to open TCP connections to multiple servers in
serial) and also may reduce ASAPs relative benefit (when connection establishment
latency is dwarfed by other delays). Evaluating such application-level performance is
an important consideration for future work.
Building-in Halfback into a web browser and evaluating the performance: To add
Halfback into a web browser, we need to implement it in kernel layer, which may re-
duce its performance due to some system problems. For example, we use pacing strat-
egy in Halfback, which may result in a high CPU utilization. Besides this, concurrent
connections may also reduce the performance of Halfback.
Combining Halfback and ASAP: ASAP tries to reduce the time spent on connection
establishment and Halfback tries to reduce the time for data transmission. Combining
them helps us to achieve flow completion time as two RTTs and all data received in one
RTT. However, there is some additional work needed, such as RTT estimation during
connection establishment.
Evaluating the suggestions for path inflation deduction: We give some suggestions
to reduce path inflation in §5.4. However, we didn’t evaluate how these suggestions
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may work based on the real traffic records in the Internet. This kind of evaluation will
be very useful for us to design mechanisms to reduce path inflation or latency inflation.
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Appendix A: Bounding the
number of PVs
We model a network as an arbitrary graph G with n vertices V , and assume that it
employs fixed but arbitrary single-path routing. That is, when s sends a message to
d, it follows a specific arbitrary path P (s, d); these paths may or may not be related
to shortest paths in the network. The attacker can eavesdrop on some set of locations
A ⊆ V , and therefore can eavesdrop on s d traffic when P (s, d) ∩A 6= ∅.
Definition 1 A source-destination pair (s, d) is attackable in a protocol (TCP or Half-
back) for a given set E if the attacker can cause s to send a flow of data to d. A desti-
nation d is attackable if there exists a source s for which (s, d) is attackable. If there
are ≥ n/2 such sources, then d is highly attackable.
We assume that Halfback uses a set P of PVs which are trusted by all servers. There-
fore, if any d is attackable in Halfback, then (s, d) is attackable for all sources s.
Theorem 1 Suppose (k + 2) log2 n PVs are placed in uniform-random locations, and
the attacker eavesdrops on an arbitrary set of k locations after knowing where the PVs
are placed. With probability≥ 1− 1n (over the choice of PV locations), any destination
that is attackable in Halfback is highly attackable in TCP.
PROOF. Fix any destination d and attacker locationsA. Let SA be the set of sources
s for which the attacker can eavesdrop on the path s  d, and let f = |SA|/n. If
f ≥ 12 , then d is highly attackable in TCP and the theorem holds for this d.
Otherwise, if f < 12 , for Halfback, Pr[d is attackable] = Pr[P ⊆ SA] = f |P | <
2−|P |. Now, we want to bound the probability that any of the n possible destinations is
attackable for any of the
(
n
k
)
possible sets A. By a union bound over these n
(
n
k
)
events,
the probability that any bad event happens is < n
(
n
k
)
2−|P | ≤ nk+12−|P | ≤ 1n since
|P | ≥ (k + 2) log2 n.
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